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Provisional Measures in the Inter-

American Human Rights System: An
Innovative Development in International
Law
Jo M. Pasqualucci*
ABSTRACT

In this Article, Professor Pasqualucci examines the developing
jurisprudence of provisional measures in the Inter-American
human rights system. Through the adoption of provisional measures, a human rights court may order a state to protect persons
who are in danger of imminent death or torture. The authorfirst
provides an overview of the Inter-American system of human
rights. She then describes the historical background of the jurisprudence of provisional measures in the International Court of
Justice and the European human rights system, which served as
models for provisional measures in the developing Inter-American
system. Finally, she analyzes the use of provisionalmeasures in the
unique economic, social, and cultural context of the Inter-American system. The author determines that Inter-American Court orders of provisional measures are binding on parties to the Ameri-

can Convention. The author also finds the Court is introducing
prerequisites to the adoption of provisional measures that may curtail their use in cases in which they would be essential to protect
persons in danger. Finally, the author argues that if the Court is
to continue to adopt provisional measures and adequately enforce
human rights in the Americas, the Organization of American
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States must reevaluate its prioritiesand provide adequatefunding
to the human rights enforcement organs.
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INTRODUCTION

In the highlands of Guatemala, near the village of Chunima, four
Guatemalan human rights activists were murdered and one was seriously wounded in separate attacks over a five month period. The victims
belonged to a local Indian group that reported human rights abuses in
the area.' Two leaders of the Civil Defense Patrol,2 which the Guatemalan Military had organized, publicly threatened some of the victims and
subsequently bragged about the murders. The army, in a nearby installation, did not come to the assistance of the villagers, and the police could
not act. Even the two local judges who investigated the murders and
issued arrest warrants for the Civil Patrol leaders received death threats

and were forced to go into hiding. Several remaining group members and
their families also went into hiding; despite these precautions, another

1. "Several hundred villagers from Quiche province, founded the Council of Ethnic
Communities Runujel Juman (CERJ), the first organization established to defend the

rights of Guatemala's Maya population" and to increase the Indian community's awareness of its rights under the Guatemalan Constitution. Inter-Am. C.H.R. 444, 447-48,

OEA/ser.L/V/II.79, doc. 12 rev. 1 (1990-91).
2. The Civil Defense Patrols, also known as the Civil Defense Guard, were established by the Guatemalan government in 1982 ostensibly to protect the highland villages

from guerrillas. The Civil Patrols "are military structures established by the military."
Id. at 446.
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member was murdered.'
Under traditional human rights law, little can be done formally to

provide immediate assistance to those whose lives are in imminent danger. Human rights treaties rest on the principle that governments basically respect the rule of law and act in good faith.' Therefore, governments accused of violations receive ample time to respond to complaints
filed against them.' Even when a government repeatedly fails to acknowledge requests for information, the government still must be allowed the statutorily allotted period to respond.6 Many states, although
adhering to human rights treaties so as not to appear less civilized than
others, hesitate to limit their state sovereignty' by granting the power to
effectively supervise their domestic behavior to an international body.'
This time-consuming approach to justice is inadequate in urgent situations that may result in the death or torture of the victim. 9 This approach is especially inadequate and unacceptable when a government
undertakes the gross and systematic violation of human rights to perpetuate its power. Governments may perpetrate gross and systematic violations of human rights in such number and manner as to threaten the
lives, safety, and liberty of a particular group of people;'0 in the

3. Request for Provisional Measures in Case 10.674 (from the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights [hereinafter Inter-Am. C.H.R.] to the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights [hereinafter Inter-Am. Court]) Inter-Am. Court 42, 42-43, OAS/
serL/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991) [hereinafter Request for Provisional Measures-Chunima
Case].
4.

CECILIA M.

QUIROGA, THE BATTLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: GROSS, SYSTEMATIC

VIOLATIONS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 316 (1988) [hereinafter QUIROGA].
5. Id.
6. See infra note 39, for an example of extensions granted despite a government's

repeated failure to cooperate.
7. International law is based on the concept of state sovereignty, which holds that
states have almost complete freedom-to act within their domestic jurisdiction and forbids
external interference into a state's "domestic" affairs. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 287-97 (1990). The influence of human rights law is
slowly modifying the principle of sovereignty. See generally, PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 11 (1983).

8. QUIROGA, supra note 4, at 2.
9. See Order of the Court in the Chunima Case, Aug. 1, 1991, Inter-Am. Court 52,
55, OAS/ser.L/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991) [hereinafter Order of the Court-Chunima Case].
10. QUIROGA, supra note 4, at 16. See Van Boven Report in United Nations E/
CN.4/Sub.2/1991/7 (No one definition exists as to what constitutes a gross violation of
human rights.); Thomas Buergenthal, Codificationand Implementation of International
Human Rights, in HUMAN

DIGNITY, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN

RIGHTS 15-21 (Alice H. Henkin ed., 1979) (A general consensus is forming that at least
genocide, apartheid, torture, mass killings, and massive arbitrary deprivations of liberty
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Chunima case, it was directed against Indian human rights activists." In
these cases, the government has an interest in continuing its course of
conduct and in defeating any attempts to curtail its abuses. 2 Gross and
systematic human rights violations have been and are still prevalent in
certain countries of Latin America, and immediate action is necessary to

protect the victims. Conversely, the government in these instances has an
interest in delaying and manipulating the system.
The immediate referral of a case to an international court would focus
international attention on the situation, and the resulting publicity could
curtail some abuses even before the court reaches a judgment. Adverse
international publicity often has proven to be an effective tool in limiting
human rights violations. 3 Most 'states are surprisingly sensitive about
their international reputations and world image. According to a former
United States representative to the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights, "Despite the harsh realities of power politics, world
opinion is a force to be reckoned with. Governments do devote much
time and energy, both in and out of the U.N., to defending and embellishing their own human-rights image and demeaning that of others.' 4
During the "dirty war" in Argentina, when agents of the Argentinean
government reportedly caused approximately nine thousand people to
disappear,' 5 Argentina hired a high-powered public relations firm in
New York to improve its international image.' 6 "Embarrassment, and
the threat of embarrassment," are the principal tools currently in use to
prevent human rights abuses.' 7 The threat of negative publicity is a per-

qualify as gross human rights violations).
11. Request for Provisional Measures-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 42, 42,

OAS/ser.L/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991).
12. QUIROGA, supra note 4, at 2.
13. Tom J. Farer, The OAS at the Crossroads:Human Rights, 72 IOWA L. REV.
401, 403 (1987). "Exposure, or the threat thereof, has accomplished a mitigation of barbarity in many identifiable instances throughout the Western Hemisphere." Id.
14. Morris B. Abram, The U.N. and Human Rights, 47 FOREIGN AFF. 363, 371

(1969).
15. Commission Nacional Sobre la Desaparicion de Personas,Nunca Mas [National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons, Never Again], 479 (Editorial
Universitaria de Buenos Aires 14a. ed., 1986). For a complete documentation of Argen-

tina's dirty war, see

IAIN GUEST, BEHIND THE DISAPPEARANCES, ARGENTINA'S DIRTY

WAR AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1990).

16. David Weissbrodt & Maria L. Bartolomei, The Effectiveness of International
Human Rights Pressures:The Case of Argentina, 1976-1983, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1009,
1030 (1991).

17. David Weissbrodt & Teresa O'Toole, The Development of International
Human Rights Law, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1948-
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suasive force which often compels governments to comply with international human rights norms.' 8
Adverse publicity has proven most effective when regional or international organs, such as the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly or the United Nations General Assembly, condemn the
violator state.' 9 Political reality, however, makes states hesitant to point
the finger, for fear that their own practices will be condemned in the
future. 20 Therefore, international courts, which are less susceptible to
politics and which also generate widespread publicity, are an avenue of
relief when a case can be timely referred. 21 Normally, however, the procedures which must be undertaken before an international human rights
court will consider a case are excessively time-consuming, and thus there
is a significant delay before the case can be submitted to a court.
Fortuitously, the Inter-American human rights system did provide
timely assistance in the Chunima case. Upon receiving the human rights
complaint, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (InterAmerican Commission) relied on an innovative provision of the Ameri-

1988: HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 17, 25
(Amnesty Int'l ed., 1988).
18. See FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS 52 (1990); Nanette Dumas, Note, Enforcement of Human Rights Standards:
An InternationalHuman Rights Court and Other Proposals, 13 HASTINGS INT'L &
Comp. L. REV. 585, 607 (1990).
19. QUIROGA, supra note 4, at 321-22. The case of Nicaragua serves as an example.
After the OAS Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs passed a resolution condemning the Somoza government's inhumane treatment of its people, Somoza
resigned. In doing so, he stated, "What role do I play when I have the OAS down my
neck?" For a description and analysis of these events, see Cerna, Human Rights in Con-

flict with the Principle of Non-Intervention: The Case of Nicaragua Before the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, in DERECHOS HUMANOS,

DIREITOS HUMANOS, HUMAN RIGHTS EN LAS AMERICAS, HOMAGE TO THE

A. DUNSHEE DE ABRANCHES, OAS (1984).
20. See Weissbrodt & Bartolomei, supra note 16, at 1030.
21. An example of such relief occurred in 1983, when the Inter-American Commission requested that the Inter-American Court issue an advisory opinion as to whether
Guatemala was in violation of the American Convention when it reinstated the death
penalty. The American Convention prohibits the reestablishment of the death penalty in
states that have abolished it. Restrictions to the Death Penalty, Advisory Opinion No.
OC-3/83 of Sept. 8, 1983, Inter-Am. C.H.R., ser. A; Judgement and Opinions, No. 3
(1983). Guatemala was, at that time, engaging in summary executions and even the
Pope's request that Guatemala stop the executions had gone unheeded. In response to the
case, however, the Government of Guatemala attended the public hearing of the Court
and read a decree suspending the death penalty. Lynda E. Frost, The Evolution of the
MEMORY OF CARLOS

Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Reflections of Present and Former Images, 14
HUM. RTS. Q. 192-93 (1992).
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can Convention on Human Rights (American Convention), 22 which is
unique to the Inter-American system. This provision authorizes the Inter-American Commission in "cases of extreme gravity and urgency" to
circumvent its time-consuming intermediary procedures and to immediately request that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (InterAmerican Court) adopt provisional measures.2 3 In adopting provisional
measures, the Court orders the state to take or to refrain from taking
certain actions. In Chunima, the Court ordered the Guatemalan government to protect the lives and personal safety of those who were
threatened.2 4 The immediate referral of the case to the Court resulted in
the focus of international publicity on the impending human rights violations. The government of Guatemala arguably complied with the Court's
demands. None of the persons for whom the Court required protection
were physically harmed, and the Guatemalan government arrested the
Civil Patrol leaders. The adoption of provisional measures in the
Chunima case successfully avoided the threatened abuses. Subsequent to
this case, however, the Court appears to be introducing additional prerequisites to the adoption of provisional measures. Although provisional
measures were probably not appropriate in the two cases following
Chunima, the prerequisites on which the Court based its decisions could
curtail the use of provisional measures when they would be essential to
protect the lives and safety of those in danger.
This Article will focus on the developing jurisprudence of provisional

measures in the Inter-American system of human rights (Inter-American
system). It first will provide an overview of the Inter-American system
and explain the problem of delay in the system. This Article then will
describe the historical background of the jurisprudence of provisional
measures in the International Court of Justice and in the European
human rights system, which served as models for provisional measures in
the developing Inter-American system.2 5 Finally, this Article will describe and analyze the use of provisional measures in the unique eco-

22. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969 (entered into force July
18, 1978), OEA/Ser.K/XVI/I.1, doc. 65 rev. 1 corr. 1 (1970) [hereinafter American
Convention], reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 25, 48 OAS/ser.L/V/II.71, doc. 6 rev. 1 (1988) [hereinafter
BASIC DOCUMENTS].

23.

Id. art. 63(2).

24. Order of the Court-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 52, 53, 56, OAS/ser. L/V/
111.25, doc. 7 (1991).
25. The African Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights does not provide for
the use of provisional measures. Banjual Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, re-

printed in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
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nomic, social, and cultural context of the Inter-American system. This
Article will argue that: 1) provisional measures are binding in the InterAmerican system; 2) the Inter-American Commission is not currently
complying with the American Convention in that it does not refer provisional measures cases to the Court if a friendly settlement is not reached;
3) as a result of this malfunctioning in the system, the Court is introducing prerequisites to the adoption of provisional measures which are not
statutorily required and which interfere with the adoption of such measures when they are most needed; and 4) if the Court is to continue to
adopt provisional measures and to adequately enforce human rights in

the Americas, the Organization of American States must reevaluate its
priorities and, if necessary, eliminate certain programs and studies to
provide adequate funding to the human rights enforcement organs.
II.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS
SYSTEM

The states of the Western Hemisphere have developed a regional system to promote and protect human rights in the Americas. 26 The system
centers around a regional treaty, the American Convention on Human
Rights,27 drafted by the member states of the Organization of American
States (OAS). 28 The American Convention recognizes and defines those
human rights to be protected in the Americas. Twenty-four American
states have ratified the American Convention and thereby are obligated
to respect human rights in their domestic jurisdictions.2 9 The American
Convention also establishes a two-tiered system to enforce human rights,
the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court.30
26. For an excellent description and analysis of the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court, see ScOTT DAVIDSON, THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(1992).
27. See American Convention, supra note 22.
28. The OAS is composed of all the nations in the Western Hemisphere except Belize, Guyana, and Cuba. Cuba was expelled from the OAS in 1962 for adopting a
Marxist-Lenninist form of government. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 237 (1991).
29.

The twenty-four nations include: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Colom-

bia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraquay, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The United States has signed but
has not ratified the American Convention. See General Information about the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, disseminated by the Court [hereinafter General

Court Information] (on file with the author).
30.

American Convention, supra note 22, art. 33. See Carlos A. de Abranches, The

Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 80, 85-90 (1980-81) (pro-
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Individuals or organizations alleging human rights abuses must first
direct all complaints to the Inter-American Commission."1 The Commission then determines whether the complaint meets the statutory requisites of admissibility. 2 If it does, the Commission informs the government involved of the relevant portions of the complaint and requests
corresponding information from the government.3 3 Even if the government does not provide the information, the Commission often grants repeated extensions. 3 4 Only after complainants have exhausted the procedures before the Commission can the Commission refer the case to the
Court, and then only if the state involved has recognized the jurisdiction
of the Court. 5 The Court is the only judicial organ established by the
Convention. To date, sixteen state parties to the American Convention
have recognized the jurisdiction of the Court. 6 Procedures before the
Court are also time-consuming. As a former member of the Inter-American Commission explained, "Long before all of these procedures have
been completed, however, the patience of the complainant, although not
his injury, may have come to an end, and in many cases it may be the
37
end of the endurance or the life of the person tortured.1
Delay is a problem in the effectiveness of the Inter-American human

rights system."8 It is often years before the Commission's procedures are

viding a brief background on "the Court within the framework of the [American] Convention and the Charter of the OAS"). For a Spanish version of this article, see LA
CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHos HUMANOS IN LA CONVENCION AMERICANA

SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS 91, 125

OAS ISBN-Q-8270-1222-5 (1980).

31. The Commission is composed of seven individuals, chosen from the Member
States of the OAS, who must be of recognized competence in the field of human rights.
American Convention, supra note 22, art. 34. No two Commission members may be
nationals of the same State. Id. art. 37.
32. Id. art. 48(1)(a)
33. Id.
34. See infra note 39 for an example of extensions allowed in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case.
35. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 51(1). See Abranches, supra note 30,
at 104-05 for a discussion of State acceptance of the Court's contentious jurisdiction.
36. The following States have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See General
Court Information, supra note 29; American Convention, supra note 22, art. 62 (ratification procedures).
37. Fernando Volio, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 30 Am.
U.L. Rav. 65, 76-77 (1980-81) (requesting amendments to expedite procedures before
the Inter-American Commission).
38. Delay is also a problem in the European Human Rights system. See infra text
accompanying note 76.
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completed. In the first contentious case that the Court decided, the period
of time from the official petition to the referral of the case to the Court
was approximately four and one-half years. 9 If human rights law is to
serve a preventive function and not just a compensatory function, delay
must be minimized. Thus, the Inter-American Commission's unprecedented use of an immediate request to the Court to mandate provisional
measures, and the Court's expedited procedures in such a case, may be a
resource in making human rights law a more effective means of combating human rights abuses.

III.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS COURT

A. Introduction
Traditionally, the adoption of provisional measures 40 has been limited
to those instances in which the case is before a court or administrative

39. The facts of the Velasquez Rodriguez case provide an example of delays and
continuations in the Inter-American system. Manfredo Velasquez was detained by government agents in Honduras on September 12, 1981, and subsequently disappeared. On
October 7, 1981, relatives filed a human rights petition with the Inter-American Commission. The Commission communicated the relevant parts of the petition to the government for a response and tried on several occasions to obtain information, but the government failed to reply. On October 4, 1983, two years after the petition was originally
filed, having received no response from Honduras, the Commission applied its regulations and presumed as true the allegations contained in the petition. Only at that point
did Honduras reply, requesting reconsideration of the Commission's determination on
various grounds. On May 30, 1984, the Commission agreed to reconsider its resolution
and again requested information from Honduras. Honduras did not respond to the request. On January 29, 1985, the Commission informed Honduras that it would render a
final decision in March, 1985. On March 1, Honduras again requested an extension on
the grounds that it had set up an investigatory commission. The Commission granted an
additional thirty day extension. On October 17, 1985, Honduras gave the Commission a
report of its investigation, in which charges against all officials were dismissed except for
the charge against a former general who was in exile and out of favor with the government. Finally, on April 18, 1986, (four and a half years after the petition was filed), the
Commission referred the case to the Court. After two more years, final judgement in the
case was pronounced by the Inter-American Court on July 29, 1988. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Court 35, 36-37, OAS/ser. L/V/
111.19, doe. 13 (1988) [hereinafter Judgment of the Court-Velasquez Rodriquez Case].
40. Various terms are used to denote the same meaning in international documents:
"4provisional measures," "interim measures," "interim measures of protection," "precautionary measures," "emergency measures," ".urgent measures," and "conservatory measures." The term "provisional measures" will be used in this Article except when the
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body.41 In such cases, provisional measures have been adopted to preserve the rights of the parties4 2 and to protect against irreparable damage
to the subject matter of the dispute while it is pending.43 The adoption of
provisional measures allows the court to request or to order a party to
adopt or refrain from certain actions and to maintain the status quo until
final judgment is rendered." For example, the court could order a state
-to refrain from fishing in certain contested waters or to provide protection to certain persons. In international human rights law, provisional
measures are most often adopted to protect a potential victim from torture or death.45
The authority to adopt provisional measures has an historical basis in
both domestic and international legal systems. 46 In United States domestic courts, the equivalent of an order of provisional measures is an interlocutory injunction, also referred to as a preliminary injunction.41 Orders
of provisional measures also exist in the civil law system. 48 Internationally, the doctrine and practice of the International Court of Justice has
been most influential in developing the jurisprudence of provisional meaapplicable source used another term.
41. See Rules of the ICJ [hereinafter ICJ Rules], reprinted in SHABTAI ROSENNE,
PROCEDURE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, A COMMENTARY ON THE 1978 RULES
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 149-57 (1983). Article 73 provides that
"[a] written request for the indication of provisional measures may be made by a party at
any time during the course of the proceedings in the case in connection with which the
request is made." Id. at 157.
42.

JERZY SZTUCKI, INTERIM MEASURES IN THE HAGUE COURT: AN ATTEMPT AT

(1983).
43. A party can incur irreparable damage, physically or to property rights, during
time-consuming administrative and judicial procedures. Id. at 1; EDWARD DUMBAULD,

A SCRUTINY 70

INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSIES 28 (1932).

44. See

JEROME

B. ELKIND,

INTERIM PROTECTION,

A

FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

3

(1981): see also SZTUCKI, note 42, at 72. It should be noted, however, that the adoption
of provisional measures does not prejudice the decision on the merits of the case. Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, June 29, 1987, reprintedin
BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 22, art. 29(4).
45.

American Convention, supra note 22, art. 63(2) (specifying that provisional mea-

sures shall be granted when "necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons").
46. For a compilation of past and present international organs competent to decide
on provisional measures, see SZTUCKI, supra note 42, at 4-11; DUMBAULD, supra note
43, at 33-129 (Most domestic and international juridical and arbitral systems have historically provided for the adoption of provisional measures).
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
48. See ELKIND, supra note 44, at 26-28 (describing provisional measures in Europe

and Japan). See also, Codigo de Procedimientos Civiles de Costa Rica arts. 449-64
(1987), Codigo de Procedimientos Civiles de Chile art. 280 (1983), Codigo Procesal
Civil y Comercial de la Nacion arts. 195-210 (Argentina) (1987).
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sures. In human rights law, the European human rights system has pioneered their use. Finally, the Inter-American System of Human Rights
is adapting the doctrine and practice of provisional measures to the
unique conditions of the Americas.
B.

ProvisionalMeasures in the InternationalCourt of Justice

The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the judicial organ of the
United Nations, has jurisdiction to settle legal conflicts between the
member states of the United Nations when the states have accepted its
jurisdiction. 9 The ICJ normally does not take jurisdiction in human
rights cases except in exceptional circumstances, when grave violations of
human rights threaten to result in an international conflict. In such a
case, the ICJ would not base its jurisdiction on the problem of human
rights, but on the conflict that the problem had provoked. 50 Although the
ICJ only considers cases which involve conflicts between states,"1 its
treatment of provisional measures has served as an inspiration in the
European and Inter-American human rights systems, in which most
complaints are made by individuals against a state.5 2 Consequently, there
are parallels between the procedures in the three systems. 53
The Statute of the International Court of Justice authorizes the Court
to indicate provisional measures. Article 41 provides in relevant part,
"The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to
preserve the respective rights of either party."'"
This power of the ICJ is discretionary in that it is fact-specific and
granted on an ad hoc basis in the appropriate circumstances.5 5 A party
49. U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
50. Rodolfo Piza, Coordination of the Mechanisms for the Protection of Human
Rights in the American Convention with Those Established by the United Nations, 30
AM. U. L. REV. 167, 184-5 (1980).
51. See SZTUCKI, supra note 42, at 17.

52. Hector Gros Espiell, El Procedimiento Contencioso Ante La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos [Contentious ProcedureBefore the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights] 67, 73 and 83, in LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS [THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS] (Inter-American Institute of

Human Rights, n.d.).
53. Id. at 73.
54. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055 (entered into force
Oct. 24, 1945) art. 41(1), reprinted in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, SELECTED DOCUMENTS 27 (1991).
55. See Leo Gross, The Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular
Staff in Tehran: Phase of ProvisionalMeasures, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 395, 406 (1980);
see also SZTUCKI, supra note 42, at 61.
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may request the measures56 or the ICJ may indicate the measures
proprio motu. 57 The Court has further concluded that, based on its authority to indicate provisional measures proprio motu,5 81 it has the au-

thority to indicate these measures even if one party fails to appear before
the Court, which has become a recurring problem. 9
The Rules of the ICJ establish the guidelines and procedures for the
indication of provisional measures." The ICJ Rules provide that a request for provisional measures must be accorded priority over all other
cases. 1 The ICJ treats a decision on the request as a matter of urgency,
and the Court, if it is not sitting when the request is made, shall convene
to allow the parties to present their observations in oral proceedings
before the Court. 2 Pending the oral hearing, the President of the ICJ
may call upon the parties to act in a way that will enable a potential
order of provisional measures to be effective.6 The Court's authority to
grant provisional measures is not limited to those measures requested by
a party. The Court may, in fact, indicate measures that are partially or
totally different from those requested, or it may adopt measures which
must be taken by the party which made the request.6 4 The Court must
communicate any measures it indicates to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations for communication to the Security Council. 5
It has become increasingly common in recent cases brought before the

56. ICJ Rules, supra note 41, art. 73. Articles 73-78 of the Regulations of the ICJ
regulate provisional measures. The Rules cited are the 1979 Rules of the International
Court of Justice. Many cases refer to the 1972 Rules or the 1946 Rules which encompass different articles. See ROSENNE, supra note 41, at 149-57 for a commentary on
changes to the rules.
57. ICJ Rules, supra note 41, art. 75.

58. Id.
59. See infra note 259 concerning failure of States to appear before the Court when
provisional measures are requested in a case.
60. See ICJ Rules, supra note 41. The ICJ Rules served as the basis of the Rules of
Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Rules of Procedure of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, adopted by the Court at its Twenty-Third
Regular Session, held on January 9-18, 1991 [hereinafter Inter-American Court Rules],
reprinted in BASIc DOCUMENTS, supra note 22, at 117.
61.

ICJ Rules, supra note 41, art. 74.

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. art. 75. At any time before final judgment, the Court, at the request of a
party, may revoke or modify its decision on provisional measures should there be a relevant change in the situation of the case. In such an instance, all parties must be afforded
the opportunity of presenting their observations on the subject. Id. art. 76.
65. Id. art. 77. In the implementation of the provisional measures, the Court may
request relevant information from the parties. Id. art. 78.
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ICJ for one party to request provisional measures. In the Case Concern-

ing Military and ParamilitaryActivities In and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaraguav. United States of America), the Court granted Nicaragua's
request for provisional measures to prevent the United States from continuing to mine Nicaraguan harbors. 6 In the Case Concerning United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, the ICJ granted the
United States request for provisional measures to effect the release of the
hostages during the Iran crisis." Unfortunately, the defendant did not
comply with the measures ordered in either case.
The two main controversies concerning an indication of provisional
measures by the ICJ have been whether the Court can indicate provisional measures when the Court has not determined yet that it has jurisdiction on the merits; 8 and whether the provisional measures indicated
are binding on the parties.6 9 The- ICJ recently has resolved the jurisdictional controversy by holding that the Court may indicate interim measures when the party requesting such measures has made a prima facie
showing of jurisdiction. The binding nature of the measures has not yet
71
been resolved by the Court.
C.

ProvisionalMeasures in the European Human Rights System

The European states have a highly evolved system for the promotion
and protection of human rights. Predating the Inter-American system,
the European human rights system is based on the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention). 7 Twenty-three states have ratified this treaty. 73 The
66,

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),

23 I.L.M. 468, .473 (I.C.J. 1984).
67. United States Diplomatic and Consuler Staff of Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 74 AM. J.
INT'L L. 258, 266 (I.C.J. 1980) (Order of the Court on the Request for Provisional
Measures).
68. For a complete discussion of this controversy, see SZTUCKI, supra note 42, at
221-259; M. H. Mendelson, Interim Measures of Protection in Cases of Contested Jurisdiction, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 259 (1972-73).
69. For a detailed discussion of this subject, see SZTUCKI, supra note 42, at 260-94;
ELKIND, supra note 44, at 153-66.
70. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
23 I.L.M. 468, 473 (I.C.J. 1984).
71. See discussion infra part VI.A.
72. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (1950) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953); reprintedin BAsIC DOCUMENTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 326 (Ian Brownlie ed., 1992). See generally Rosalyn Higgins, The European Convention on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES

495 (Theodore Meron ed., 1984).
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enforcement organs for the protection of the rights in the European Convention are the European Commission on Human Rights (European
Commission) and the European Court of Human Rights (European
Court)."4 As in the Inter-American system, complaints of human rights

abuses are first processed by the European Commission before they can
be referred to the European Court.75 It takes an average of five years for
a case to reach final judgment in the European human rights system."
In general, the European human rights system confronts isolated instances of human rights abuse rather than gross and systematic violations."" Most of the cases that the European system processes relate to
"arrest and detention guarantees and fair administration of justice, and
not the chilling and harrowing violations in other parts of the world."7 8
Provisional measures in the European system are most often indicated
when a petitioner faces expulsion or extradition to a state in which he
claims he will be subject to torture or inhumane and degrading punishment. 9 In these cases, when it is highly probable that the petitioner will

suffer irreparable damage in the receiving country," the European Commission may request that the European state threatening expulsion or
extradition refrain from taking action and allow the petitioner to remain
until the European Commission and Court have examined the case. l

73. The States which have ratified the European Convention are: Austria, Belgium,
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. See CARTER & TRIMBLE,
supra note 54, at 429.
74. European Convention, supra note 72, art. 19. See generally, J.G. MERRILLS,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW By THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS (1988).
75. European Convention, supra note 72, arts. 32, 48.
76. Heribert Golsong, On the Reform Of the Supervisory System of the European
Convention On Human Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. L.J. 265, 265 (1992) (citing Council of

Europe Document MDH (85) 1, 5); see INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS,
OF LAW AND POLICY 549 (Richard Lillich & Frank Newman eds., 1979).

PROBLEMS

77. Rolv Ryssdal, The Future of the European Court of Human Rights,
ECOUR90296.AB, 4 (1990).
78. E.V.O. Dankwa, Conference on Regional Systems of Human Rights Protection
in Africa, the Americas and Europe, 13 HUM. RTs. L.J. 314, 316 (1992); see also
Ryssdal, supra note 77, at 4.
79. Carl A. Norgaard & Hans C. Kruger, Interim and Conservatory Measures
Under the European System of Protection of Human Rights, in PROGRESS IN THE
SPIRIT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 109, 112 (1988).
80. Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (1991). See also Norgaard & Kruger, supra note 79, at 112.
81. See, e.g., Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (1991).
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The European Commission will indicate this interim measure only when
a party presents evidence which demonstrates a probability that irreparable damage would result from the expulsion.82
There is no statutory authority in the European system to provide for
the adoption of provisional measures by either the European Court or
the European Commission.8 3 The European Convention does not contain
a provision authorizing the adoption of provisional measures.8" In the
early years of the system, when a need for provisional measures was
perceived, the Secretary, on behalf of the European Commission, asked
state parties unofficially to refrain from taking certain actions.8 5 Most
states voluntarily complied with these requests.88 Subsequently, the European Commission incorporated a Rule of Procedure authorizing it to
indicate provisional measures.8 7 At present, the authority for the adoption of provisional measures lies in the Rules of Procedure of the European Commission 88 and the European Court.89
The European Commission rule on interim measures provides that the
Commission "may indicate" interim measures which seem "desirable." 90
The rule also authorizes the President of the Commission to indicate
interim measures when the Commission is not in session. 9' The Euro-

pean Court rule is similar and provides that the Court, or the President
of the Court, may, at the request of any party concerned, or proprio
motu, indicate any interim measure which is advisable.9 2 Furthermore
any interim measure indicated by the European Commission during its
82. Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1991). In addition, the
indication of provisional measures will only be given if the petitioner has exhausted all
domestic remedies which would have the effect of suspending the decision to expel. Norgaard & Kruger, supra note 79, at 113.
83. See Norgaard & Kruger, supra note 79, at 109.
84. This lack of provision in the European Convention is in contrast to Article 41 of
the Statute of the ICJ and Article 63(2) of the American Convention which do provide
the enforcement tribunals with statutory authority.
85. See Norgaard & Kruger, supra note 79, at 111; P. VAN DIJK AND G.J.H. VAN
HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

65-66 (1990).

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Rules of Procedure of the European Commission on Human Rights, rule 36
[hereinafter European Commission Rules].
89. Rules of Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights, rule 36 (as
amended by the Court on 26 January 1989), ECOUR91156.EW, 36 (1991) [hereinafter
European Court Rules].

90. European Commission Rules, supra note 88, rule 36.
91. Id.
92.

European Court Rules, supra note 89, rule 36.
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consideration of a complaint remains recommended after the case has
been brought before the European Court, pending further consideration
by the Court.9" As the wording of both rules implies, the authority to
adopt provisional measures is discretionary. 4 Also, the use of the term
"indicate" implies that the measures are mere suggestions to be complied
with in good faith, rather than binding orders.
The European Court has held, in Cruz Varas v. Sweden, that a rule
on interim measures not included in the Convention is merely procedural
and therefore does not create a binding obligation on the contracting parties.95 In Cruz Varas, a Chilean National who had been denied political
asylum in Sweden petitioned the European Commission to consider his
case. He alleged that expulsion to Chile, where he was likely to be tortured, amounted to inhuman treatment in violation of Article 3 of the
European Convention, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 6 The European Commission requested
that Sweden, pursuant to Commission Rule 36 on interim measures, delay the expulsion of Cruz until the Commission could hear his case and
reach a decision. Sweden failed to honor the Commission's request for
interim measures and carried out the expulsion. The European Commission then found that Sweden had violated the Convention.97 Sweden referred the case to the European Court, which held that, in the absence of
a specific provision in the Convention, the European Commission did not
have the power to order interim measures. 8
Cruz Varas dealt only with the European Commission's power to indicate interim measures, not with the European Court's power. The European Court's reasoning, however, that interim measures are not binding when there is no specific provision in the Convention granting such
power would apply also to provisional measures indicated by the Court.
The Court specifically stated that the power to order binding interim
measures could not be inferred from the article in question "or from

93.

Id. rule 36(3).

94. Compare id. with European Commission Rules, supra note 88, rule 36.
95. Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34-35 (1991).
96. European Convention, supra note 72, art. 3.
97. The Commission held that Sweden had violated Article 25(1) of the European
Convention which provides: "Those of the High Contracting Parties who have made
such a declaration [to allow the Commission to examine individual petitions] undertake
not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right." In doing so, the Commission
concluded that by deporting the petitioner, Sweden hindered his effective exercise of the
right to petition the Commission, in violation of the Convention. Cruz Varas v. Sweden,
201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 46-47 (1991).
98. Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 38 (1991).
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other sources." 9 Rather, the Court reasoned that the contracting parties
to the European Convention should determine if they would remedy the
situation by adopting a new provision to the Convention."
This lack of power is not as debilitating to the European System as it
first might appear. Those states incorporated into the European human
rights system are governed by the rule of law. Politically, the states of
Europe are democratic and stable. Economically, they are developed
states, without extremes of poverty and wealth. Socially, literacy rates

are high, and most Europeans have access to the media.'01 European
nations provide a safety net of social programs, including old age social
security and health care. These states in general protect human rights
and have accepted, for the greater part, the decisions of the European
Human Rights Commission'
and the judgments of the European
03
Court.1

99. Id. at 36.
100. Id.

101. Burns H. Weston et al., Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and
Appraisal, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585, 616 (1987).
102. In the thirty-one instances prior to the Cruz Varas Case, where the Commission had indicated provisional measures in expulsion cases, no State Party had failed to
comply. Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 51 (1991). However, the
Court also stated that in several cases concerning extradition, the Contracting-States had
not complied with Rule 36 indications. Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 25 (1991).
An interesting example of provisional measures in an extradition case in the European
system is the Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1 (1989). In Soering, the
United Kingdom complied with a European Court indication of provisional measures
and refused to allow a prisoner to be extradited to the U.S. pending the outcome of
proceedings before the Court. According to the facts of the case, Soering, who was
charged with murder in the State of Virginia, was arrested in England and ordered
extradited to the United States. The prosecutor in Virginia expressed his intention to
seek the death penalty in the case. Id. at 12. Soering petitioned the European Commission to halt the extradition on the grounds that the extradition would violate the European Convention's prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Id. at
32. Soering did not claim that the death penalty per se was inhuman or degrading punishment. He claimed rather that he was likely to be condemned to death, and the "death
row phenomenon," whereby a prisoner over a period of years suffers increasing stress

and anguish while awaiting execution, was itself cruel and inhuman punishment. Id.
As a provisional measure, the Court indicated to the Government of the United Kingdom that it would be advisable not to extradite Soering to the U.S. pending the outcome
of the proceedings before the Court. The Government complied with this request. Id. at
9.
103. See MARK W. JANIS & RICHARD S. KAY, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
xliii (1990).
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Voluntary compliance may not be so forthcoming in the future, however. The potential influx of additional states into the European system,
many of which have histories of egregious human rights violations and
little experience with democracy, may alter the functioning of the system.10 4 As a result, European human rights scholars and functionaries
have discussed changes, which may include an additional protocol to the
Convention or a redrafting of the Convention.10 5 Should changes be
made, the European system should include a statutory provision with
more definite wording to, make it clear that provisional measures are
binding on the parties.' 6
IV.

PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM

A. Introduction: The Social, Economic, and Political Context of the
Inter-American System
It is necessary to contrast briefly the social realities of the developed
states of Europe with the underdeveloped states of Latin America'0 7 to
understand the important distinctions between the two areas, in types of

human rights violations, and, consequently, in the jurisprudence of provisional measures. Human rights violations, perhaps because of the different contexts, take on a distinct character in the two regions.
Whereas Europe has historically been governed by the rule of law, 08

104. With the political changes in Eastern Europe, countries including Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria have joined the Council of Europe and have ratified
or are preparing to ratify the European Convention. The inclusion into the European
system of these new countries, which have little recent experience in democracy, may
result in multiple problems for the European human rights institutions. Golsong, supra
note 76, at 265-66; Ryssdal, supra note 77, at 9-11.
105. Id. (discussing possible changes to the European system including a permanent,
full-time Court and Commission).
106. Such a provision was considered and rejected under a less compelling situation.
In 1971, the Committee of Ministers, on being asked to draft a Protocol to the European
Convention which would empower the Commission and Court to order interim measures, determined that a Protocol was unnecessary as Contracting Parties complied with
the requests of the Commission. The Committee did, however, adopt a formal recommendation to the States in which it recommended that States comply with Commission
requests for interim measures. See Golsong, supra note 76; Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34-35 (1991); Norgaard & Kruger, supra note 79, at 115.
107. Although the U.S. and Canada are members of the OAS and, therefore, are a
part of the Inter-American system, neither has ratified the American Convention of
Human Rights, and neither arguably engages in the gross and systematic human rights
abuses which are widespread in certain Latin American countries.
108. Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe provides that "every Member
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the reality of most Latin American states is more somber."0 9 Politically,
much of the area is still unstable. Although several states recently returned to democracy after years of military dictatorships, the future of
these fledgling democracies is still precarious. Internal conflicts continue,
and the military and death squads retain varying amounts of power.
Furthermore, most states of Latin American are economically underdeveloped and confront serious financial problems, from repayment of their
international debts to widespread poverty for significant portions of the
population." 0 These grave extremes of poverty and wealth further contribute to the political instability of the region. Population pressures conis limited,
tinue to mount, literacy rates are low,"' access to education
112
exploitation.
and
injustice,
misery,
face
people
many
and
The existence of social and economic oppression, in many cases, gives
rise to political oppression and to the ruthless and continuous violations
of human rights." 3 The Inter-American system often confronts gross and
systematic human rights violations," 4 rather than the individual violations of Europe." 5 As Professor Thomas Buergenthal, former President

of the Inter-American Court, stated, "The political and economic realities of the Americas, where non-democratic regimes and large-scale poverty persist, make enforcement of human rights in this region much more
difficult than in Western Europe.""' As a result of the differences be-

of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law . . . ." Statute of
the Council of Europe, art. 3, reprinted in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, STATUTES OF THE
COUNCIL OF EUROPE 9 (1968).

109. See generally, JOHN H.

MERRYMAN

&

DAVID S. CLARK, COMPARATIVE

LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS

110.

(1978).

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR CENTRAL AMERICA RECOVERY AND DE-

VELOPMENT, POVERTY, CONFLICT AND HOPE: A TURNING POINT IN LATIN AMERICA

(1989) (report for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate) [herein-

after

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION].

111. See Weston et al., supra note 101, at 227-28 (arguing that the repressive socioeconomic and political conditions, low levels of literacy, unavailability of the media, and
arbitrary denial of the protection of law inhibit individual access to the human rights
system).
112. Hector Gros Espiell, La Convencion Americana y La Convencion Europea de
Derechos Humanos, Analisis Comparativa [The American Convention and the European Convention, A ComparativeAnalysis] 35, EDITORIAL JURIDICA DE CHILE (1991);

see generally, INTERNATIONAL
113.

COMMISSION,

supra note 110.

Volio, supra note 37, at 72-73. See Angela Cornell & Kenneth Roberts, Democ-

racy, Counterinsurgency,and Human Rights: The Case of Peru, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 529,
533-35 (1990).
114. See DAVIDSON, supra note 26, at 4-5.
115. See Ryssdal, supra note 77, at 4
116. Thomas Buergenthal, The American And European Conventions on Human
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tween the regions, the Inter-American human rights system, which has
benefited immeasurably from the experience of the European system,
must modify these lessons.' "For better or for worse, the problems of
our Hemisphere are more unique to the Americas than they are universal or European. They can only be solved within the framework of our
own legal, cultural, political, and social traditions.""' Even the European experience with provisional measures in human rights law must be
adapted to the Inter-American system." 9
Provisional'measures potentially have a significant role to play in the
Inter-American system owing to the urgent character of many of the
human rights claims which are brought before the Inter-American Commission. The potential for irreparable damage to persons in these cases
often requires an immediacy of response which may result from the implementation of provisional measures. 20 This preventive function of provisional measures, when the lives and physical security of persons are
concerned, is far more valuable than the compensatory function of a final
judgment.
B.

The Statutory Basis of the Court's Authority to Order
Provisional Measures

Article 63(2) of the American Convention expressly provides for the
Inter-American Court's authority to adopt provisional measures. This
provision reads: "In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when
necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons, the Court shall adopt
such provisional measures as it deems pertinent in matters it has under
consideration. With respect to a case not yet submitted to the Court, it
may act at the request of the Commission."'' The adoption of provisional measures is discretionary, as in the ICJ and European system.
The Court must make an ad hoc determination as to whether such measures are called for under the circumstances of each case. This power of
the Court, however, is not to be exercised lightly. The Court's adoption
Rights: Similarities and Differences, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 155, 156 (1980-81); see DAVIDSON, supra note 26, at 4.
117. Buergenthal, supra note 116,,at 166.
118. Id.
119. Gros Espiell, supra note 52, at 73. Although the Rules of Procedure of the
European Court have, in general, been a source and an inspiration for the Rules of
Procedure of the Inter-American Court, the Inter-American system relied more closely
on the jurisprudence of provisional measures in the ICJ in developing its jurisprudence
of provisional measures. Id.
120. See Abranches, supra note 30, at 79, 109.
121. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 63(2).
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of provisional measures is "an extraordinary instrument, one which becomes necessary in exceptional circumstances."' 2 2 The Court's Rules of
Procedure further support this discretionary nature by providing that
"the Court may .. .order whatever provisional measures it deems appropriate."' 2 3 Lacking this context, the Convention's statement that "the
Court shall adopt such provisional measures, ' 1 24 conceivably could imply
that the Court has a legal duty to adopt provisional measures. This interpretation, however, is not consistent with the traditional function and
jurisprudence of provisional measures.' 25 More likely, the words "shall
adopt" demonstrate the binding character of the measures. The authorization that the Court adopt the measures it deems pertinent' 2 6 also allows the Court to exercise its discretion to decide which, if any, provisional measures are justified in a particular situation.
The Court has the authority to adopt provisional measures both in
"matters it has under consideration" and "[w]ith respect to a case not yet'
submitted to the Court.' 27 In the first instance, the term "matters" includes contentious cases that the Court is entertaining. The question,
however, is why the drafters did not simply use the term "cases" in this
context. Dunshee de Abranches has posited that the choice of the word
"matters" in place of "cases ' raises the interesting possibility that the

Court may also adopt provisional measures in the context of a request
for an advisory opinion if there is urgent danger of irreparable damage
to a person.' 2 9 Traditional international law has not made provisional
measures available in advisory matters except perhaps when two states
agree to request an advisory opinion in a veiled contentious situation. 3

122. Request for Provisional Measures-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 42, 45,
OAS/ser.L/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991). See Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
LEGAL AND POLICY IssuEs 439, 465 (Theodore Meron ed., 1984) [hereinafter Buergenthal, The Inter-American System].
123. Inter-American Court Rules, supra note 60, art. 24(1).
124. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 63(2).
125. See SZTUCKI, supra note 42, at 61.
126. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 63(2).
127. Id.
128. Abranches states that the Convention uses the term "case" in referring exclusively to specific denunciations submitted to the contentious jurisdiction of the Court. The
Convention uses the term "matter" in a broader sense to refer to "situations" or "questions" submitted to the Commission but not to the Court. Abranches, supra note 30, at
109.
129. Id. at 125. See DAVIDSON, supra note 26, at 49 (citing Abranches but opining
that the problem is unlikely to arise).
130. See SZTUCKI, supra note 42, at 139.
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Nothing, however, in the Inter-American Convention bars this use in the
unlikely event that provisional measures should prove pertinent.13
A more logical explanation exists, however, for the use of the term
"matters" in the first sentence of Article 63(2). In this context, the term
"matters" rather than "cases" clarifies that the criteria of "extreme gravity and urgency," and "when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to
persons," apply not only to the adoption of provisional measures in cases
that are before the Court under the first sentence of Article 63(2) but
also to the adoption of provisional measures at the request of the Commission when a case has not yet been submitted to the Court. A "case
not yet submitted to the Court" would not yet be referred to as a "case."
Under the terminology of the Convention, "case" refers exclusively to
specific denunciations submitted to the contentious jurisdiction of the
Court.' 32 Thus, "a case not yet submitted to the Court"' 3 3 would be
merely a "matter" before the Court on a request for provisional measures. The second sentence of the provision does not otherwise provide
criteria necessary for considering such Commission requests.
The Commission's authority to request the Court to adopt provisional
measures even when the case has not yet been submitted to the Court is,
potentially, the most innovative advance in the jurisprudence of provisional measures in human rights law. Both the Convention and the Statute of the Commission provide for a procedure which allows the Court
to adopt provisional measures in urgent circumstances at the request of
the Commission, even when the case is not before the Court."3 Traditionally, a court's authority to order provisional measures has been limited to the period during the course of proceedings in the case."3 5 Under
this provision, however, the Inter-American system does not have to
await the termination of formal proceedings before the Commission. The
Court thus can respond more quickly in urgent circumstances to prevent
human rights abuse.

131. See DAVIDSON, supra note 26, at 49; see also Restrictions to the Death Penalty
(Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Human Rights), reprinted in 23 I.L.M.
320 (1983) (Inter. Am. Court H.R. Advisory Opinion) (for a possible scenario in which
provisional measures may have been justified in an advisory opinion had the concerned
State then been subject to the jurisdiction of the Court).
132. Abranches, supra note 30, at 109.
133. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 63(2).
134. Id. See also Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art.
19(c) (1979) [hereinafter the Statute of the Commission], reprinted in BASIc DocuMENTS,

supra note 22, at 65.

135. The ICJ rules provide that "[a] written request for the indication of provisional
measures may be made by a party at any time during the course of the proceedings in
the case in connection with which the request is made." See ICJ Rules, supra note 41,
art. 73 (emphasis added).
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C. Jurisdiction of the Court
Provisional measures may only be adopted by the Court when the

Court has first determined that it has jurisdiction over the state party
involved.136 To date, no state has challenged the Court's jurisdiction to
decide on provisional measures. Normally this will not be a difficult issue in the Inter-American System, as the subject matter of the Convention is limited to human rights abuses. Most state parties which have
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court have done so without reservations
or with only a reservation ratione temporis, which limits the jurisdiction
to offenses which have taken place since the date of ratification. 37 Irreparable damage to persons by torture or death is a human rights abuse
and is without doubt within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court
for any state that has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. Furthermore, the necessary urgent nature of cases calling for provisional measures means that the danger must be occurring in the present, and therefore would not have occurred exclusively before a state party's
acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction.
In the event, however, that jurisdiction becomes an issue in a particular case, the gravity and urgency of any situation calling for provisional
measures should encourage the Court to follow the relevant precedent of
the ICJ. 38 The ICJ holds that, when considering a request for provisional measures and a corresponding objection to jurisdiction, the ICJ
need only satisfy itself that there appears to be a prima facie basis for
the ICJ's jurisdiction. The ICJ need not satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case.139 Thus, a prima facie basis of jurisdiction
should also be sufficient for the Inter-American Court when considering
requests for provisional measures.

136.

Buergenthal, The Inter-American System, supra note 122, at 465. But see Gros

Espiell, supra note 52, at 83 (arguing that according to Articles 23.1, 23.5 and 27 of the
Rules of the Inter-American Court, the Court can adopt provisional measures even
before deciding the question of jurisdiction).
137. See Signatures and Current Status of Ratifications, 55-64, reprinted in BAsic
DOCUMENTS, supra note 22, at 55.
138. Buergenthal, The Inter-American System, supra note 122, at 465-66.
139. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
23 I.L.M. 468, 473 (I.C.J. 1984).
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D.

Role of the Commission

Neither the American Convention nor the Statute of the Inter-American Commission extends the authority to adopt provisional measures to

the Inter-American Commission.14 ° The Commission's self-authorized
regulations, however, empower the Commission in urgent cases to take
any action necessary for the discharge of its functions."" The action may
include making a direct request to a state that it take "precautionary
measures" to protect persons."" This provision parallels the European
Commission's Rules of Procedure by which the European Commission
empowered itself to make a request for provisional measures in certain
cases."" The Inter-American Commission's regulations also provide for
immediate action. If the Commission is not in session the Chairman or
when necessary, one of the Vice-Chairmen, may decide to request the
measures on behalf of the Commission.144 As with provisional measures
in other cases, the request for these measures and their adoption shall
not prejudice the final decision on the merits of the case. 4"
The Commission also has the authority to request that the InterAmerican Court take provisional measures whether the matter is before
the Court or the case has not yet been submitted to the Court. 4 6 If the
Court holds a public hearing on the question, it is the responsibility of
the Commission to present the position of the petitioners." 7 It is also
within the purview of the Commission to suggest those measures to be
taken by the government. In certain cases the Court has charged the

140. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 63(2), and The Statute of the Commission, supra note 134, art. 29(2), only authorize the Commission to request that the
Inter-American Court take provisional measures.
141. Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, April 8,
1980 (modified on June 29, 1987), art. 29(1), reprinted in BAsIc DOCUMENTS, Supra
note 22, at 75 [hereinafter Regulations of the Commission].
142. Id. art. 29(2). Note that the Spanish and English versions of Article 29 are not
in accordance. The Spanish version is entitled "Medidas Cautelares", which means Pre-

cautionary Measures. The internal reference in Article 29(2) uses the identical term,
"medidas cautelares". The English version, however, uses the term "precautionary mea-

sures" in the title, but then changes to the term "provisional measures" in the body of
Article 29(2). Most case law uses the term "precautionary measures" when referring to

measures which the Commission requests directly from a government, and "provisional
measures" when referring to measures which the Court requests of a government.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
101, at

See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
Regulations of the Commission, supra note 141, art. 29(3).
Id. art. 2.
American Convention, supra note 22, art. 63(2).
American Convention, supra note 22, art. 61; see Weston et al., supra note
604-05.
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Commission with oversight of a government's compliance with the measures ordered and with a subsequent duty to report to the Court."4 8
E. Requirements of Admissibility Before the Commission
The question arises whether the Commission can adopt precautionary
measures or request that the Court adopt provisional measures when the
requirements for admissibility of a petition, as provided in the Convention, have not been met. The Commission has maintained, in a request
for provisional measures, that the urgent risk of irreparable damage to
persons absolves the Commission from the prior necessity of defining admissibility according to the requirements of the Convention. 4 9 In this
regard, the Commission stated that "such precautionary measures may
be requested even when the admissibility of a case has not yet been defined by the Commission pursuant to Article 46 of the Convention, since,
by their very nature, provisional measures arise from a reasonable presumption of extreme and urgent risk of irreparable damage to persons."' 50 Conversely, Gros Espiell, an Inter-American Court judge for
twelve years and a former president of the Court opined that the Commission must accept a case, thereby making at least a preliminary decision on admissibility, before requesting that the Court adopt provisional
measures in that case.' The Court, in considering provisional measures
requested by the Commission, has not challenged the Commission's

148. In the Chunima Court Order, the Court adopted provisional measures for a
limited time and required that the Commission advise the Court as to the implementation of the Order. Order of the Court-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 52, 55, OAS/
ser.L/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991).

149. Request for Provisional Measures in Case 10.548, Inter-Am. Court 25, 27,
OEA/ser.G/CP, doc. 2146 (1991) [hereinafter Request for Provisional MeasuresBustios-Rojas Case]. The Commission was referring to provisional measures requested
by the Commission (usually referred to as precautionary measures). However, this would
also apply to provisional measures requested of the Court.
150. Id.
151.

HECTOR GROS ESPIELL, ESTUDIOS SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS [STUDIES OF

170 (1988); see also Gros Espiell, supra note 112. But see Aguilar
Andres, Procedimiento que Debe Aplicar la Comision Interamericana de Derechos
Humanos en el Examen de las Peticiones o ComunicacionesIndividualesSobre Presuntas Violaciones de Derechos Humanos, in DERECHOS HUMANOS EN LAS AMERICAS
[Procedurethat the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Should Apply in the
Examination of Individual Petitions and Communications of Presumed Violations of
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS] OAS 199, 204 (arguing that the
Commission should dispense with formal requirements of admissibility in urgent situations to avoid human rights violations and to comply with the humanitarian character of
its duties).
HUMAN RIGHTS]
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stance on admissibility. Whether this is due to the failure of a state party

to object, thus constituting a waiver of the procedure, or to the basic
agreement of the Court with this premise, is unclear.
A prima facie determination that a petition meets the requirements of
admissibility should be made before the Commission may request that
the Court adopt provisional measures. Even in serious and urgent cases,
with the prior consent of the state, the Convention specifies that the petition or communication must fulfill all the formal requirements of admissibility for the Commission to conduct an investigation. 152 The Convention provides that the Commission has the power "to take action on
petitions and other communications pursuant to its authority under the
provisions of Articles 44 through 51" of the Convention.1 53 These Articles contain the requirements which parties must fulfill before the Commission may admit a petition or communication.'
Furthermore, the
regulations of the Commission provide that the Commission "shall take
into account [petitions] only when they fulfill the requirements set forth
in [the] Convention, in the Statute and in these Regulations.' 15 ' These
provisions have been interpreted to require that the Commission need
only make a prima facie determination that the petition meets the re-

quirements of admissibility 15 and thereby accept the petition "in principle.' ' 5 7 The Commission need not make an express declaration of ad-

152. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 48(2); see also Regulations of the
Commission, supra note 141, art. 44(2).
153. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 41(0.
154. The formal requirements of admissibility are that 1) the domestic remedies have
been exhausted, 2) the petition has been lodged within a period of six months from the
date of violation of the right, 3) the subject of the petition is not pending in another
international proceeding, 4) the petition contains the appropriate information, including
the name, nationality, profession, domicile, and signature of the person or legal representative lodging the petition, 5) the petition states facts that tend to establish a violation of
rights protected by the Convention, and the petition is not manifestly groundless or out of
order. American Convention, supra note 22, arts. 46(a)-(d), 47(b)-(c).
155. Regulations of the Commission, supra note 141, art. 31.
156. The normal practice of the Commission is to first make a prima facie determination of admissibility based on the requirements of Articles 46 and 47. Thereafter it
must furnish the information in the petition to the government and await a response for
a prescribed period. Then, depending on whether the Government has responded and the
content of the response, the Commission may, inter alia, declare the petition inadmissible on the basis of information received, presume the truth of the allegations, or place
itself at the disposal of the parties to facilitate a friendly settlement. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 48(1) ; see DAVIDSON, supra note 26, at 25.
157. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26,
1987, para. 39, Series C: No. 3.
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missibility.' 5 8 If the Commission is claiming that it need not make even a

preliminary prima facie determination of admissibility, rather than simply restating the accepted principle that it need not make a final decision
of admissibility, its stance is not legally justifiable. Statutory authority
does not absolve the Commission from making a prima facie determination of admissibility even in serious and urgent cases, and thus the Court
should so hold in requests for provisional measures.

F. The President's Adoption of Interim Measures Pending the
Convocation of the Court
In light of the urgent nature of a provisional measures request and the
part-time nature of the Court, the President of the Court is authorized to
"call upon" a government to adopt emergency measures when the Court
is not in session. 5 The Commission may present a request for provisional measures "to the President, to any judge of the Court, or to the
Secretariat, by any means of communication." 6 '
Previously, the rules required that the President, after adopting urgent
measures when the Court was not sitting, call the Court into session
immediately. 16 ' The prospect of special sessions was well beyond the

158. Id. The Commission can decide on the admissibility of the petition based on the
petition itself. If the Commission has ruled that the petition is admissible, it may request
information from the government which subsequently may show that the petition is not
admissible because, for example, domestic remedies have not been exhausted or the communication is manifestly groundless. Abranches, supra note 30, at 112.
159. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-Am. Court of H.R., art. 24(4), modified by the
Court at its Twenty-Seventh Regular Session, held in January 1993 (not yet published)
[hereinafter Court Rules of Procedure].
In Chunima, the Court coined the term "emergency measures" to differentiate be-

tween "provisional measures" which can be adopted by the Court, and the measures
which the President is authorized to order the government to adopt until the Court can
meet. Order of the Court-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 52, 55, OAS/ser.L/V/III.25,
doc. 7 (1991). There may be a problem of translation, in that the Spanish version of
Chunima refers to "medidas de urgencia" (measures of urgency) which the President
may require of the parties. This term is more in keeping with the Rules of Procedure of
the Court which authorizes the President to require "medidas urgentes"(urgent measures). The Spanish translation is authentic.
160. Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 159, art. 24(3).
161. This rule was modified at the Court's Twenty-Seventh Regular Session in January, 1993. It now provides that:
If the Court is not sitting, the President, in consultation with the Permanent
Commission and, if possible the judges, shall call upon the government concerned
to adopt the necessary urgent measures and to act so as to permit any provisional
measures subsequently ordered by the Court in its next regular session to have the
requisite effect.
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budget of the Court, even if the Comission only occasionally requests
provisional measures. 6 2 Recently, however, the Court adopted a procedural modification to counterbalance the need for provisional measures
with the financial limitations of the Court. Rather than meeting in special session, the President can adopt urgent measures, and the Court will
consider the request and the President's response to it at its next regular
session,'6 3 thus eliminating the expense of a special session of the
Court.""
A foreseeable difficulty with this modification could arise should a
government refuse to comply with the urgent measures of the President
in a case which, by its definition, is grave and urgent and threatens irreparable harm to persons. The urgent measures dictated by the President do not appear to be binding on the state parties,'6 5 as the authority
is granted by the Court's self-adopted Rules of Procedure, not by the
Convention. 6' Furthermore, the very wording of the rule implies that
the President's resolutions in this matter would not be binding. The rule
provides that the President "shall call upon the government" to take
measures "and to act so as to permit any provisional measures, subsequently ordered by the Court ... to have the requisite effect."' 6 7 In the

event that a government -did not comply with the President's resolution,
it would be necessary for the full Court to meet. Although this modifica-

Id. art. 24(4). Article 25(1) of the Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
[hereinafter Statute of the Inter-American Court], reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS,
supra note 22, at 105, authorizes the Court to draw up its Rules of Procedure. Article
25(2) provides that, "[t]he Rules of Procedure may delegate to the President or to Committees of the Court authority to carry out certain parts of the legal proceedings, with the
exception of issuing final rulings or advisory opinions. Ruling or decisions issued by the
President or the Committees of the Court that are not purely procedural in nature may
be appealed before the full Court." Id. art. 25(2).
162. See infra text accompanying notes 329-340.
163. Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 159, art. 24(4) as modified.
164. The seat of the Court is in San Jose, Costa Rica. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
art. 2, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 22. The Court may, however, convene in any Member State of the OAS. Statute of the Inter-American Court, supra note
161, art. 3.

165. Restrictions to the Death Penalty, supra note 131, at 326.
166. Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 159, rule 24(4). However, the President's
resolutions are labeled Orders both by the President and the Plenary Court. See Order of
the President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of July 15, 1991, Inter-Am.
Court 46, 50-51, OAS/ser.L/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991) [hereinafter Order of the President-Chunima Case]; Order of the Court-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 52, 55, OAS/
ser.L/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991).
167. Court Rules of Procedures, supra note 159, rule 24(4).
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tion to the Court's Rules is positive, it may not be adequate if requests
for provisional measures increase and states do not comply with the
President's requests for urgent measures.
To date, the Court has not been sitting on any of the occasions when
the Commission has requested the Court to adopt provisional measures.
On two of these occasions, the President, in consultation with the other
judges, made formal orders of urgent provisional measures.168 In both
cases, the terms of the orders were general, requiring the state to adopt
without delay all necessary measures to protect the right to life and the
physical integrity of the persons named.'
The Presideflt did not attempt to suggest any specific actions to be taken or avoided by the government. The President, operating under the rule which required that he
immediately convene the Court, then scheduled a public hearing170 to
allow the plenary Court the opportunity to determine whether provisional measures were required. 7 '
Although a question may exist about whether the emergency measures
ordered by the President are binding on a government, the Court has
stated unequivocally that these measures are not subsequently binding on
the plenary Court." 2 The Court itself is careful to distinguish between
the provisional measures that the Court has the authority to adopt under
Article 63(2) of the Convention, and the "emergency measures" the

168. To date, the President has adopted urgent measures on two occasions and the
States have at least purported to comply with them. See Order of the President in the
Bustios-Rojas Case, Inter-Am. Court 29, 31, OEA/ser.G/CP, doc. 2146 (1991) [hereinafter Order of the President--Bustios-Rojas Case]; Order of the President--Chunima

Case, Inter-Am. Court 46, 50-51, OAS/ser.L/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991). In the Honduran
cases the President called upon the State to act, but did not officially adopt measures.
Honduras responded that it would take the measures suggested. Judgment of the CourtVelasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Court 35, 43, OAS/ser.L/V/III.19, doc. 13
(1988). The President made these orders pursuant to Article 23(4) of the Rules of Court
adopted in 1980, which has since changed. See supra note 161 for the present version of
the rule, which is now Article 24(4).
169. Order of the President--Bustios-Rojas Case, Inter-Am. Court 29, 31, OEA/
ser.G/CP, doc. 2146 (1991); Order of the President-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 46,
50-51, OAS/ser.L/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991).
170. Order of the President--Bustios-Rojas Case, Inter-Am. Court 29, 31, OEA/
ser.G/CP, doc. 2146 (1991); Order of the President-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 46,
50-51, OAS/ser.L/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991).
171. Order of the President--Bustios-Rojas Case, Inter-Am. Court 29, 31, OEA/
ser.G/CP, doc. 2146 (1991); Order of the President-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 46,
50-51, OAS/ser.L/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991).
172. Order of the Court-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 52, 55, OAS/ser.L/V/
111.25, doc. 7 (1991).
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President can order under Article 24(4) of the Rules.173 The emergency
measures requested by the President do not result in a 'fait accom74 Those measures ordered by the President serve to avoid irreparapli"Y.
ble actions until the Court can meet to study the matter.Y At that time
the Court may refuse to adopt provisional measures or may adopt measures other than those mandated by the President. To date, however, the
1 8
Court has ratified all provisional measures adopted by the President.
G. Cases in Which the Court Has Ordered Provisional Measures
Once the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility have been determined, the decision whether the Court will adopt provisional measures is
fact-specific. The factual situation must demonstrate the requisites of

gravity, urgency, and the likelihood of irreparable damage to persons to

7
justify adopting the extraordinary remedy of provisional measures.1
The Inter-American Court has considered requests for provisional
measures in five instances, and has ordered that a state take provisional
measures in three of those instances.' 7 8 In only one instance, that of the
three joined Honduran cases were provisional measures requested when
the case was on the Court's docket.' 7 9 In the other cases, as well as on
the two occasions when the Court refused to adopt provisional measures,
the Commission requested that the Court adopt provisional measures in
cases which had not yet been submitted to the Court.' ° It is necessary to

173.

Id. See supra note 168 (discussing the change in the emergency measures rule,

from Article 23(4) to Article 24(4)).
174. Order of the Court-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 52, 55, OAS/ser.L/V/
111.25, doc. 7 (1991).
175. Id.
176. See id. at 56; Order of the President--Bustios-Rojas Case, Inter-Am. Court 29,
31, OEA/ser.G/CP, doc. 2146 (1991).
177. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 63(2).
178. Order of the President-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 46, 47, OAS/ser.L/V/
111.25, doe. 7 (1991); Order of the President--Bustios-Rojas Case, Inter-Am. Court 29,
31, OEA/ser.G/CP, doe. 2146 (1991); Judgment of the Court-Velasquez Rodriquez
Case, Inter-Am. Court 35, 44, OAS/ser.L/V/II.19, doc. 13 (1988); Godinez Cruz
Case, Judgment of January 20, 1989, Series C: No. 5; Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales
Case, Judgment of March 15, 1989, Series C: No. 6. The last three cases were Hondu-

ran cases which were joined by the Inter-American Court. For purposes of this section,
these cases will be referred to only by the name of one case, the Velasquez Rodriguez
case.
179.

Judgment of the Court-Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Court 35, OAS/

ser.L/V/III.19, doc. 13 (1988).
180.

American Convention, supra note 22, art. 63(2).
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consider the cases to understand the reasoning of the Court in making its
determinations.
1. Honduran Cases
In the Honduran Cases, 8" the Commission requested that the Court
order Honduras to take provisional measures to protect the lives of witnesses who had testified, or who were scheduled to testify, before the
Court.' 8 2 The Honduran Cases arose from the alleged forced disappearances of more than 100 people in Honduras from 1981 to 198483 and
resulted human rights petitions to the Inter-American Commission.' In

1986, the Commission unable to reach a friendly settlement between the
parties, referred three of these cases to the Court.' 85
A public hearing on the merits of the cases was held in October 1987.
At that time, several Honduran nationals testified that numerous persons
had been kidnapped and had disappeared in Honduras and that these

181. The Commission referred three cases to the Court, all based on alleged disappearances in Honduras. Judgment of the Court-Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am.
Court 35, OAS/ser.L/V/III.19, doc. 13 (1988). See supra note 39 for facts of that case.
182. Judgment of the Court-Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Court 35, 43-44,
OAS/ser.L/V/III.19, doc. 13 (1988).
183. Id. at 63. Typically, the practice of disappearances followed a recognizable pattern. The victims were usually student or union leaders, human rights activists or others
suspected of being subversives, who were often first placed under surveillance prior to the
abduction. Id. at 56. The kidnappers drove vehicles with tinted glass, which required a
government permit. The vehicles either did not have license plates or were equipped with
false plates. The kidnappers, at times dressed in civilian clothes, with or without disguise, and at other times wore military attire. They took the victims from their homes, or
even from public streets in the presence of witnesses. In one instance, the police attempted to intervene but the kidnappers identified themselves as special security forces
and were then allowed to take the victim. Id. at 55. Victims were often brought to secret
detention centers where they were tortured and sometimes murdered. Id. at 56. Families,
if they dared seek out their relatives, were given no information. See Commission Nacional Sobre la Desaparicion de Personas, Nunca Mas [National Commission on-the
Disappearanceof Persons,Never Again], supra note 15, for a detailed description of the
practice of "disappearance" during the Dirty War in Argentina. See also, Linda
Drucker, Governmental Liabilityfor 'Disappearances':A Landmark Ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, STAN. J. INT'L L 289, 299-300 (1988); James
LeMoyne, Testifying to Torture, N. Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, June 5, 1988, at 45 (interviewing two witnesses to the Honduran cases).
184. Judgment of the Court-Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Court 35, 36
OAS/ser.L/V/III.19, doc. 13 (1988).

185. Id. at 37; Godinez Cruz Case, Judgment of January 20, 1989, Series C: No. 5;
Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales Case, Judgment of March 15, 1989, Series C: No. 6.
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1 8 On
disappearances were imputable to the Honduran Armed Forces.
their return to Honduras following the hearings, two witnesses received
death threats. The Commission then requested that the Court adopt interim measures under Article 63(2) for the protection of these witnesses. 87 As the Court was not in session at the time of the Commission
request, it fell upon the President, in conjunction with the Permanent
Commission, to determine whether urgent measures were called for
under the circumstances, and, if so, to convene the Court.1 88 The President did not formally request urgent provisional measures. Rather, the
President forwarded the Commission's information to the government of
Honduras along with the statement that although he did not have
enough proof as to the identity of the party responsible for the threats,
he nonetheless "strongly wishe[d] to request" that the government of
Honduras take all measures necessary to guarantee the safety of the lives
and property of the two witnesses threatened.' 89 The President did not
convene the Court at that time, but stated in his communication to Honduras that he would do so if the abnormal situation continued. 9 ° In
response, Honduras informed the Court that it would guarantee the two
named witnesses "the respect of their physical and moral integrity."' 9 '
Although the two named witnesses were not subsequently harmed,
shortly thereafter three92other past and prospective witnesses were assassinated in Honduras.'
The Court, sitting on the date of the final assassination, required
Honduras immediately to adopt provisional measures necessary "to prevent further infringements on the basic rights of those who have appeared or have been summoned" to appear before the Court.'9 3 The
Court also ordered the government to investigate the crimes and to identify and punish the perpetrators. 9 4 The Commission subsequently re-

186. Judgment of the Court-Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Court 35, 41,
OAS/ser.L/V/III.19, doc. 13 (1988).
187. Id. at 43.

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 44; see DAVIDSON, supra note 26, at 50 (arguing that the provisional
measures ordered "come perilously close to implicating the Honduran government in the
assassinations and threats.").
194. Judgment of the Court-Velasquez Rodriquez Case, Inter-Am. Court 35, 44,
OAS/ser.L/V/III.19, doc. 13 (1988).
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quested more detailed, complementary provisional measures. 19 5 A public
hearing was held regarding these additional measures. The Court resolved that Honduras was to inform the Court of specific measures
adopted to protect the witnesses and of its investigations of the threats
the reand assassinations: Honduras, in compliance, later submitted
196 No additional witnesses were harmed.197
quired reports.
2.

Bustios-Rojas Case (Peru)

In the Bustios-Rojas Case, the Commission relied, for the first time,
upon its authority under Article 63(2) of the Convention to request provisional measures in a case not yet submitted to the Court. The Commission requested that the Court order Peru to adopt provisional measures
to protect witnesses in a case before the Commission.' 98 According to the
Commission's Request, in November 1988 two Peruvian journalists had
been ambushed while in route to investigate a murder. One of the journalists, Hugo Bustios-Saavedra, was killed while the other was
wounded. 99 An eyewitness to the attack, who had accused members of
the Peruvian military of responsibility, was subsequently murdered.20 0
The military threatened and detained two other eyewitnesses, and both
the wife of the assassinated journalist and the journalist who survived the
attack received death threats. The government, however, neglected to investigate their complaints.20 1
The petitioner, the Committee for the Protection of Journalists,
claimed that, under the circumstances, the very filing of a petition before
the Commission placed the lives of the surviving victim and the witnesses

further at risk.20 2 Therefore, the petitioners submitted that "there [was]

195. Id. at 45.
196. Id. In addition Honduras was required, to adopt measures "to make clear that
the appearance of an individual before the Inter-American Commission or Court of
Human Rights... is a right enjoyed by every individual." Id.; see DAVIDSON, supra
note 26, at 51 (arguing that there is no such right under the applicable legal
instruments).
197. Judgment of the Court-Velasquez Rodriquez Case, Inter-Am. Court 35, 45-46,
OAS/ser.L/V/III.19, doc. 13 (1988); see generally, Juan E. Mendez and .Jose M.
Vivanco, Disappearances and the Inter-American Court: Reflections on a Litigation
Experience, 13 HAMLINE L. REV. 507 (1990) (for a detailed description and analysis of
the Honduran cases.)
198. Request for Provisional Measures-Bustios-Rojas Case, Inter-Am. Court 25,

28, OEA/ser.G/CP, doc. 2146 (1991).
199.

Id. at 25.

200. Id.
201.
202.

Id. at 26.
Id. at 25.
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an urgent need for precautionary measures to compel the government to
cease and desist from intimidating the victims and witnesses and to guarantee their lives and personal safety until a final decision on the merits
of the petition [was] rendered."20 3 The Commission directly requested
that precautionary measures be taken by the government of Peru to protect the lives and personal integrity of the seven named persons20 and, in
the same resolution, requested that the Court also adopt provisional
measures in the case.20 5
The Court was not sitting at the time of the Commission's request.
The President of the Court resolved to convene the Court, hold a public
hearing, and enjoin that the government of Peru to immediately adopt
those measures necessary to protect the lives and personal integrity of the
persons named in the Commission request.20 6 The Peruvian government
asked for a postponement of the public hearing, even though it claimed
to have adopted the necessary measures.20 7 The Court denied the request
for a postponement.20 8
At the public hearing, the Commission claimed that the only measure
taken by the government had been a public radio announcement asking
the persons threatened to meet at military headquarters, a measure that
intimidated the very persons it supposedly was designed to protect.2 0 9
The representative of the government could not cite to any other measures it had taken. 210 The Court, therefore, resolved to allow the Peruvian government a limited time to adopt adequate measures and to inform the Court as to their nature.21 x The Court further charged the
Commission with the duty to inform the Court about Peruvian governmental compliance. In addition, the President and the Permanent Com-

203. See Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Violations
of the Human Rights of Peruvian Journalists Hugo Bustios Saavedra and Eduardo

Rojas Arce (May 3, 1990) (submitted by the Committee to Protect Journalists, 16 East
42nd Street, Third Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017, USA) (on file with author).
204. Request for Provisional Measures--Bustios-Rojas Case, Inter-Am. Court 25,
28, OEA/ser.G/CP, doe. 2146 (1991).

205. Id.
206. Order of the President--Bustios-Rojas Case; Inter-Am. Court 29, 31, OEA/
ser.G/CP, doe. 2146 (1991).
207. Order of the Court in the Bustios-Rojas Case, Aug. 8, 1990, Inter-Am. Court
33, 34, OEA/ser.G/CP, doc. 2146 (1991) [hereinafter Order of the Court-BustiosRojas Case].
208. Id. at 35.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 37.
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mission of the Court 212 were authorized to adopt any additional measures deemed necessary, to verify the implementation of the Court's
order, and to inform the Court thereof.21 3 In the subsequent Court Order of January 1991, the Court required Peru to continue provisional
measures and returned the case to the Commission.21 4
3. Chunima Case (Guatemala)
The Chunima Case involving Guatemala" 5 presented the third instance in which the Court ordered provisional measures. As with the
Bustios-Rojas Case, this case was before the Commission but not the
Court. After several members of a Guatemalan Indian human rights
monitoring group had been murdered and others threatened with
death, 210 Americas Watch and the Center for Justice and International
Law filed a petition with the Commission.21 1 In response the Commission made a formal request that the Court adopt the provisional measures necessary to protect the lives and safety of fourteen people.21 The
Commission did not directly request that Guatemala take precautionary
measures to protect those at risk.21 9 Instead, it relied solely on the conventional power of the Court to order provisional measures.2 2 °
As the Court was not sitting at the time of the Chunima request, the
President initially resolved "[t]o order" the government of Guatemala to

212. The Permanent Commission of the Court is composed of the President, Vice
President and a third judge named by the President. Court Rules of Procedure, supra
note 159, art. 6.
213. Order of the Court--Bustios-Rojas Case, Inter-Am. Court 33, 37, OEA/ser.G/
CP, doc. 2146 (1991).
214. Order of the Court in the Bustios-Rojas Case, Jan. 17, 1991, Inter-Am. Court
15, 16, OAS/ser.L/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991) [hereinafter Second Order of the Court-Bustios-Rojas Case]. In this Order, the Court additionally required that Peru provide
civilian liaison authorities. Id.
215. Request for Provisional Measures-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 42, OAS/

ser.L/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991). The Court's jurisdiction over Guatemala in this case was
based on Guatemala's ratification of the American Convention on May 25, 1978 and
Guatemala's acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court on March 9, 1987.
Article 1(1) of the Convention provides that all States Parties are obligated not only to
respect the rights and freedoms recognized in the Convention but also to ensure their free
and full exercise to all persons subject to their jurisdiction.
216. Id. at 43. For a more complete description of the facts of the case, see supra
part 1.
217. Id. at 42.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 45.
220. Id.

INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS

19931

adopt, in general, all necessary measures to protect the life and physical
integrity of those named in the Commission's request.22 l The President
also convened a special session of the Court and ordered the government
of Guatemala and the Commission to appear at a public hearing. 22
Guatemala, although it twice requested postponement of the hearing, did
appear and present its position. 223 Furthermore, at the hearing, Guatemala announced the arrest and incarceration of the principal suspects, in
accordance the arrest warrants issued and with the request of the
Commission.2 24
The Court resolved to confirm the President's order and extend its
effect for a set time.225 It further ordered the Guatemalan government to
specify the measures taken in compliance and the Commission to inform
the Court of their implementation. 226 At the end of the time specified,
the measures lapsed.

H. Cases in Which the Court Denied ProvisionalMeasures
In 1992, the Commission requested that the Court adopt provisional
measures in two cases which were before the Commission but had not
been submitted to the Court.227 In these two cases, both of which involved the government of Peru, the Court refused to order provisional
2 28

measures.

221. Order of the President-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 46, 50-51, OAS/ser.L/
V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991).
222. Id. at 51. At the time of the President's Order, the Rules of Procedure of the
Court required that the President convoke the Court immediately upon receiving a request for provisional measures.
223. Id. at 54.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 56.
226. Id.,
227. Chipoco Case, Resolution of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Jan.
27, 1993, Provisional Measures Requested by the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights Regarding Peru (on file with the author) (to be published in the 1993
Annual Report of the Inter-American Court) [hereinafter Resolution of the Court-Chipoco Case]; Peruvian Prisons Case, Resolution of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, Jan. 27, 1993, Provisional Measures Requested by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Regarding Peru (on file with the author) (to be published in the
1993 Annual Report of the Inter-American Court) [hereinafter Resolution of the CourtPeruvian Prisons Case].
228. Resolution of the Court-Chipoco Case (on file with the author) (to be published
in the 1993 Annual Report of the Inter-American Court); Resolution of the Court-Peruvian Prisons Case (on file with the author) (to be published in the 1993 Annual Report
of the Inter-American Court).
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1. The Chipoco Case (Peru)
In the Chipoco Case, the Commission requested provisional measures
to protect Peruvian human rights activist Carlos Chipoco, who had previously cooperated with the Commission when Peru was accused of violating human rights. Chipoco was criminally charged in Peru with the
crime of "justification of terrorism against the state" 22 ' a conviction
which could have resulted in loss of Peruvian nationality and more than
twenty years in prison.2 30 Although Chipoco was in the United States at
the time of the indictment, he could have been tried in abstentia in Peru.
The Peruvian Court would not issue an arrest warrant, however, until
the indictment was modified to fully identify him. 231 At this stage of the
proceedings, while Chipoco was in the United States and before an arrest warrant had been issued, the Commission requested that the InterAmerican Court adopt provisional measures in the case. The Commissi6n requested that Peru be ordered to verify the truth of the allegations;
specify the existing evidence before initiating a penal action; carry out an
exhaustive investigation; specify the acts on which the charge of terrorism was based; disclose the evidence against Chipoco; and guarantee him
the full exercise of his human rights during the judicial proceedings and
23 2
the right to petition the Inter-American human rights system.
The Court was not sitting at the time of the request, and the President
refused to adopt the urgent measures requested. 3 Since an arrest warrant for the alleged victim had not been issued, the President found that
the "conditions do not now exist which would require the Government to
adopt urgent measures of a provisional nature. 2 - 34 He did, however, resolve to submit the Commission's request to the plenary Court at its next
regular session.235 At this session, the Court also refused to adopt provisional measures, finding that the Commission had not submitted sufficient information to the Court "to support a presumption of the truth of
the allegations and of a situation whose grave seriousness and urgency
229. Order of the President in the Chipoco Case, Dec. 14, 1992, Inter-Am. Court
97, 98, OAS/ser. L/V/III.27, doc. 10 (1992) [hereinafter Order of the President-Chipoco Case].
230. Id.
231. Id. Other Peruvians were charged in the same indictment. In the indictment,
Mr. Chipoco was identified only as Carlos Chipoco, which was not his full name. The
Criminal Court of Lima ordered that the identification be completed and the indictment

amended. Id.
232. Id. at 97.
233. Id. at 99.
234. Id.

235. Id.
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' ' *s6
could cause irreparable harm to persons.

2.

The Peruvian Prisons Case

In the Peruvian Prisons Case, the Commission alleged in its request
for provisional measures, that a "grave situation" existed in various Peruvian prisons, due to the poor conditions of imprisonment of those accused and sentenced for terrorism. 2 7" The Commission further alleged
that in these prisons there was "a high incidence of diseases, loss of
weight, overcrowding, isolation and psychological and emotional
problems among male and female prisoners," as well as incidents of mistreatment, insults, and humiliation.2 8
The Commission had unsuccessfully requested precautionary measures on its own authority, seeking inter alia to visit the prisons. 23 9 The
provisional measures which the Commission requested the Court to
adopt included Peruvian authorization for a Commission on-site visit to
the prisons, for visits by relatives of the prisoners to bring them clothes,
medications, and other supplies, and for independent institutional visits
to provide medical care to the prisoners.240
The Court was not sitting at the time of the request, and the President
refused to adopt the urgent measures requested. He found that the Commission's request for an on-site visit of the prisons could not be considered a precautionary or provisional measure because Article 48(2) of the
Convention required the permission of the government of Peru for the
visit. 241 The President also found that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove the allegations of mistreatment of the prisoners and lack of
medical assistance.24 2 The Court, when it considered the request at its
next regularly-scheduled session, also found the evidence insufficient to
243
support a resolution to adopt the requested measures.

236. Resolution of the Court-Chipoco Case (on file with the author) (to be published
in the 1993 Annual Report of the Inter-American Court).
237. Order of the President in the Peruvian Prisons Case, Dec. 14, 1992, Inter-Am.
Court 101, 103, OAS/ser.L/V/III.27, doc. 10 (1992) [hereinafter Order of the President-Peruvian Prisons Case].
238. Id. at 102.
239. Id. at 103.
240. Id. at 102.
241. Id. at 104.

242. Id.
243.

Resolution of the Court-Peruvian Prisons Case (on file with the author) (to be

published in the 1993 Annual Report of the Inter-American Court).
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Requirementsfor and Contents of ProvisionalMeasures

The Court may*order whatever provisional measures it deems appropriate, but only in cases of "extreme gravity and urgency" when it is
"necessary to avoid irreparable harm to persons."2 44 The situation which
may result in irreparable harm to persons must first be urgent, 245 requiring immediate attention. The Court found that the Chunima Case
presented such an urgent situation, as five people had already been killed
and others, including the judges who issued the arrest warrants for the
suspects, had received death threats and were in hiding. 46 In the
Chipoco Case by contrast, in which Carlos Chipoco was safely in the
United States and had not yet been charged with a crime in Peru, there
was not sufficient urgency to justify the adoption of provisional
247
measures.
The primary purpose of provisional measures in the Inter-American
system is to avoid irreparable injury to persons.248 As stated above, in
human rights law, irreparable injury to persons traditionally refers to
torture or death. 249 A request for provisional measures to protect property, although allowable under the ICJ, would not be granted in the
Inter-American system. 250 The President of the Court, in what appeared
to be an informal request to Honduras, has asked that Honduras protect
the property of the human rights monitoring organization in Honduras.
The Court, however, did not repeat this request when it ordered formal
provisional measures.2 5 '
Initially in each case, the Court has adopted only general orders which
mandate that certain named persons be provided protection by the government.25 2 It has not specified particular measures that the government

244. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 63(2).
245. Urgency is generally a prerequisite for the adoption of provisional measures.
See Norgaard & Kruger, supra note 79, at 112. The prospect of injury must be imminent under the European system. Id.
246. Request for Provisional Measures-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 42, OAS/
ser.L/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991).
247. Resolution of the Court-Chipoco Case (on file with the author) (to be published
in the 1993 Annual Report of the Inter-American Court).
248. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 63(2).
249. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
250. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 63(2).
251. Judgment of the Court-Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Court 35, 43,

OAS/ser.L/V/III.19, doc. 13 (1988).
252.

Order of the Court-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 52, 53, OAS/ser.L/V/III.

25, doc. 7 (1991); Order of the President-Peruvian Prisons Case, Inter-Am. Court 101,

102, OAS/ser.L/V/III. 27, doc. 10 (1992).
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must take to fulfill its obligations of protection, despite the particularized
requests made by the Commission. In Chunima, the Commission proposed specific steps to be taken by the Government tO provide the requested protection not only for those named, but also apparently for all
human rights activists in the area.25 The Commission further requested
that the Guatemalan authorities carry out the arrest warrants issued
against the principal suspects in the case and publish a declaration in the
Guatemalan media recognizing the legitimacy of the work of human
rights monitors in Guatemala. 54 The Court, in accordance with the
Convention, limited, itself to measures to protect the persons who were in
grave and imminent danger, and simply ordered Guatemala to inform
the Court of the measures it had taken to protect the persons listed. 5
Only when the initial measures adopted by a government proved to be
inadequate did the Court specify additional measures to be taken. In
Bustios-Rojas, the Court made specific demands on Peru after being informed by the Commission of limitations in the protective measures
taken under the Court's original order.2 56 Thus, the Court, in the absence of the opportunity to educate itself about the appropriate possibilities of protection in each state, appears to refrain from ordering specific
measures; instead it will allow the government in its sovereignty to determine what measures will fulfill the Court's general demands of protection. Should these measures prove inadequate, it is the province of the
Commission to notify the Court and suggest more adequate alterna-

253. The Commission first recommended that the government of Guatemala provide
the human rights organizations with the name and telephone number of a civilian official
in the government who would be responsible for their protection; second, "that the gov-

ernment of Guatemala effectively ensure that human rights activists may return to their
homes in Chunima without fear of further persecution at the hands of civil patrols or the
army[; third,] that the Guatemalan authorities carry out the arrest warrants issued
against the principal suspects [in the case; and fourth, that the Guatemalan authorities
publish a declaration in the Guatemalan media] recognizing the legitimacy of the work of

human rights monitors in Guatemala and acknowledging that their activities are protected not only by the American Convention on Human Rights, but also by the Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala." Request for Provisional Measures-Chunima Case,
Inter-Am. Court 42, 45, OAS/ser.L/V/III.25, doe. 7 (1991).
254. Id.

255. Order of the Court-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 52, 56, OAS/ser.L/V/
111.25, doc. 7 (1991).
256. Second Order of the Court--Bustios-Rojas Case, Inter-Am. Court 15, 15-16,
OAS/ser.L/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991). The Court ordered Peru to provide civilian liaisons
in certain rural areas in addition to or in place of the military liaisons already named by

the Government. Id. at 16.
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tives,257 which minimizes the burden on the Court by putting the Commission in the position of overseer.
J.

Governmental Compliance

To date, all governments called before the Inter-American Court on
requests for provisional measures have attended the public hearings convoked by the Court and have presented their arguments. 258 This is in
contrast to the ICJ, in which the Court has had to make a decision ex
parte in the majority of requests on provisional measures. 59 In the Inter-American system, governments have requested postponements of the
hearings, but when these requests have been denied, they have complied
with their obligations to appear and have presented their positions.2 60
In general, the governments have made an effort at least to appear to
comply with both the initial orders of urgent measures made by the
President of the Court and the orders for provisional measures taken by
the full Court. In Chunima, prior to the public hearing, the Guatemalan

257. Id.
258. Guatemala appeared in the Chunima Case. Order of the Court-Chunima Case,
Inter-Am. Court 52, 54, OAS/ser.L/V/III. 25, doe. 7 (1991). Peru appeared in the
Bustios-Rojas Case. Order of the Court--Bustios-Rojas Case, Inter-Am. Court 33, 36,
OEA/ser.G/CP, doc. 2146 (1991).
259. Iran failed to appear in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case (Request for the
Indication of Interim Measures of Protection) when the United Kingdom request for
provisional measures was granted. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case (U.K. v. Iran),
1951 I.C.J. 89 (June 30). Iceland failed to appear in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases.
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), 1972 I.C.J. 12 (Aug. 17); Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, (F.R.G v. Ice.), 1972 I.C.J. 30 (Aug. 17). France failed to appear in the
Nuclear Tests Cases brought by Australia and New Zealand. Nuclear Tests Case (Austl.
v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 100 (June 22); Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 136
(June 22). India failed to appear in Concerning the Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War.
Case Concerning Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pak. v. India); 1973 I.C.J. 329
(July 13). See generally, JEROME B. ELKIND, NONAPPEARANCE AND DISAPPEARANCE
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL

COURT OF JUSTICE: FUNCTIONAL AND COMPARATIVE

(1984).
260. In the case of Guatemala, the government twice requested postponements for
the stated purpose of allowing the Government to first undertake an investigation before
presenting its position before the Court. When the Court denied the government's requests, the government accepted the Court's decision and presented its argument at the
public hearing as ordered. The hearing was delayed one day due to the Court's considerANALYSIS

ation of the requests of the government of Guatemala. Order of the Court-Chunima

Case, Inter-Am. Court 52, 53-54, OAS/ser.L/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991). In the BustiosRojas Case, Peru also requested a postponement, but appeared before the Court as ordered when the postponement was denied. Order of the Court-Bustios-Rojas Case,
Inter-Am. Court 33, 34, OEA/ser.G/CP, doe. 2146 (1991).
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government professed to be in compliance with the measures ordered by
the President by having ordered the authorities to provide protection in a
way to allow the persons named to specify the type of protection they
desired.261 The most impressive instance of government compliance was
announced at the public hearing in the Chunima Case. There, the Guatemalan government made the surprise announcement that it had arrested the civil patrol leaders as originally requested by the Commission.
The government could not, however, name any specific measures that it
had taken or would take with respect to the protection of the lives and
physical integrity of those persons it was to protect.2" 2
Although it is difficult to prove that a government complied with a
Court's order of provisional measures, it is interesting to note the occurrences in the Honduran cases.263 As stated above, in those cases, two
witnesses who had appeared before the Court received death threats.
The President of the Court, in what appeared to be less than an order of
urgent measures, requested that the government of Honduras protect
these particular witnesses. The government duly informed the Court that
it would guarantee their safety as requested.26 4 Although those particular
witnesses were not harmed, three other witnesses, who were not directly
referred to in the President's communication with the government but
who had appeared before the Court or who were scheduled to give evi2 65
dence, subsequently were murdered.
At times, a government's compliance has appeared to be perfunctory
at best. In Bustios-Rojas, Peru's response to the request for urgent measures to protect the lives and safety of certain persons was limited to a
public radio announcement requesting that the persons named for protection come to a particular military installation to discuss the provisional measures of protection.26 6
Unfortunately, despite the governments' apparent compliance in the
instances in which provisional measures have been ordered by the Court,
difficult situations continue to arise for some of those parties accorded

261. Order of the Court-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 52, 53-54, OAS/ser.L/V/
111.25, doc. 7 (1991). The Government of Guatemala also noted that in compliance with
the President's order, it had "intensified the security measures of the Chunima area in
order to provide its inhabitants with better protection." Id. at 53.
262. Id. at 54.
263.

Judgment of the Court-Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Court 35, OAS/

ser.L/V/III.19, doe. 13 (1988).
264. Id. at 43.
265. Id. at 43-44.
266.

Order of the Court--Bustios-Rojas Case, Inter-Am. Court 33, 35, OEA/ser.G/

CP, doe. 2146 (1991).
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protection.26 7 However, in the tenuous political situation in which people
continued to be murdered and disappear daily, none of those for whom
the Court ordered provisional measures of protection were harmed. This
result is not likely to be mere happenstance. Rather, it can be attributed
to the Court's order of protection and to the international publicity arising from the Court's consideration of the situation.
K.

Enforceability of ProvisionalMeasures

The Convention provides that the judgment of the Court shall be final.268 States parties to the Convention have, moreover, agreed to comply
with these judgments. 26 9 The Inter-American Court, however, lacks the
power to enforce either final judgments or orders of provisional measures. Should a State Party fail to comply with an order of provisional
measures, the only recourse of the Court is to specify the failure in its
annual report to the OAS General Assembly.27 0 A problem in the case of
provisional measures, however, is that the General Assembly meets only
once a year for a fairly short period. 7 1 Considering the urgent character
of provisional measures, this recourse will not be particularly useful unless, by chance, the meeting occurs at the point of a state's failure to
comply with provisional measures. Even then no action would be taken

unless the General Assembly has the political will to act. The statutory
remedies are not often the main instigating factors of compliance. As
Judge Buergenthal stated, "Compliance and non-compliance by states

267. In Guatemala, Amilcar Mendez, who is the founder of CERJ, the human
rights monitoring organization, and one of the persons protected under the Court's order
of interim measures in the Chunima Case, continued to have problems with the government. In one instance, while he was in the United States, Mendez was charged with
criminal activity in Guatemala and a warrant was issued for his arrest. The charge was
based on the testimony of two "campesinos" (rural peasants) who had been arrested and
who allegedly informed government officials that Mendez had supplied them with bombs
and arms. International and Guatemalan public opinion believed that these charges were
trumped up, and that Mendez would be in danger while in custody. Mendez returned to
Guatemala accompanied by several influential people, including a United States senator.
The charges later were dropped when the two witnesses admitted that they did not even
know Mendez and had lied about the arms. See Policia Nacional Tiene Orden de

Detener a Amilcar Mendez [National Police obtain an Order to Detain Amilcar Mendez], Siglo Veintiuno, November 21, 1992, at Nacional 6; Marta Altolaguirre, El Caso
de Amilcar Mendez [The Case of Amilcar Mendez], Siglo Veintiuno, November 24,
1992, at Opinion 10.
268. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 67.

269. Id. art. 68(1).
270. Id. art. 65. Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 159, art. 24(5).
271. See DAVIDSON, supra note 26, at 9.
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with their international obligations depend less on the formal status of a
judgment and its abstract enforceability. Much more important is its impact as a force capable of legitimating governmental conduct and the
' 72
perception of governments about the political cost of non-compliance.
V.

FOR THE MOST EFFECTIVE USE OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN
THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM

A.

The Binding Nature of ProvisionalMeasures

Provisional measures must be binding on the parties in the InterAmerican system to be most effective. To date, the binding nature of
these measures has not been challenged in the Inter-American system. In
the three instances in which the Inter-American Court has ddopted interim measures, none of the states parties have refused compliance. 3
However, since it has been held in the parallel context of the European
274
Convention that these measures are not binding on the states parties,
and as it is still a subject of dispute whether they are binding in the
ICJ,27 1 it is prudent to analyze the differences between the jurisprudence
of these two systems and the Convention.
The European Court has held that in the absence of a Convention
provision authorizing the enforcement organs to order interim measures,
these measures are not binding on the Contracting States to the European Convention. 27 6 Provisional measures in the European system are
authorized only by the European Court's and European Commission's
rules of procedure.2 7 Rules adopted by the enforcement organs are not
usually considered to be binding on the parties, as the parties to the
treaty have not granted this authority to these organs. 278 Conversely, express statutory provisions, such as the provisions of the American Convention and the Statute of the ICJ, which grant the courts the authority

272.

Buergenthal, The Inter-American System, supra note 122, at 470.

273.

Judgment of the Court-Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Court 35, 36-37,

OAS/ser.L/V/III.19, doc. 13 (1988); Order of the Court-Chunima Case, Inter-Am.
Court 52, 53, OAS/ser.L/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991); Second Order of the Court--BustiosRojas Case, Inter-Am. Court 15, 15-16, OAS/ser.L/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991).
274. Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 33 (1991).
275. The ICJ has not ruled as to whether an order of provisional measures is binding on the parties. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 903 cmt. (1987).
276.

See supra text accompanying notes 83-86.

277.

See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.

278.

See also SZTUCKI, supra note 42, at 64-65.
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to adopt interim measures in the proper circumstances, are more likely to
be reflective of the binding nature of the measures.2 11
Even when statutory authority for provisional measures exists, the location in the treaty of the provision may affect the extent to which these
measures are binding. It is sometimes argued that provisional measures
are not binding in the ICJ because they are merely procedural rather
than jurisdictional. 28 0 This argument is based on the location of the article on interim measures in the statute of the ICJ chapter on procedure
rather than in the chapter on the competence of the Court, which relates
to jurisdictional matters. 28 1 In contrast, Article 63(2) of the American

Convention is located in the chapter entitled "Jurisdiction and Functions ' 1112 eliminating in the Inter-American context what has been a po-"
tent argument in the ICJ for the nonbinding nature of the measures.28 3
The strength of the wording of the Article on provisional measures
also affects the extent to which it is binding. The wording of the Statute
of the ICJ, that the Court has the power to "indicate" provisional measures that "ought to be taken," is argued to imply that the Court's adoption of interim measures is a mere suggestion to be complied with out of
the good will of the state. 284 This same argument against the binding
character of the measures has been successful in the European system,

279. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 63(2); Statute of the International
Court of Justice, supra note 54, art. 41(1).
280. ELKIND, supra note 44, at 155, 156 (citing Hammarskjold). Article 41 is included under chapter III of the Statute of the ICJ, entitled "Procedure," rather than
under Chapter II of the Statute, entitled "Competence of the Court," supra note 54. See
also J. Peter Bernhardt, The Provisional Measures Procedure of the International
Court of Justice through U.S. Staff in Tehran: Fiat lustitia, Pereat Curia?, 20 VA. J.
INT'L L., 557, 561 (1980) (for a discussion of controlling provisions of the Statute of the

ICJ).
281. ELKIND, supra note 44, at 155, 156 (citing Hammarskjold).
282. The legislative history of Article 63(2) offers no explanation as to the placement
of the Article. See infra note 287.
283. The Inter-American Court has carefully elaborated its jurisdictional basis in
these matters. Under Article 63(2) the Commission is authorized to request provisional
measures in a case not yet submitted to the Court. American Convention, supra note 22,
at 48, art. 63(2). Under Article 33, the Court has competence with respect to matters
relating to the fulfillment of the commitments made by the State Parties to the Convention. Id. art. 33. Article 62(3) provides that the jurisdiction of the Court shall comprise
all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Convention that are submitted to it, provided that the States Parties to the case recognize or have
recognized such jurisdiction. Id. art. 62(3). The Court further supported its argument by
relying on Article I of the Statute of the Court. Judgment of the Court-Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Court 35, 45, OAS/ser.L/V/III.19, doc. 13 (1988).
284. ELKIND, supra note 44, at 153-66. See ROSENNE,supra note 41, at 149 & n.1.
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which also adopted the word "indicate" in its rules on provisional measures. 285 In contrast, the phrasing of the Article on provisional measures
in the American Convention avoids the traditional, but controversial
term "indicate," instead providing that the Court "shall adopt" the measures that it deems pertinent, 28 6 a more forceful term that goes beyond
mere suggestion. This more forceful language, combined with the placement of the provisional measures article in the jurisdictional chapter,
suggests that the drafters of the American Convention, by eliminating
the basis for the long standing arguments against the binding nature of
the measures, have made provisional measures binding in the InterAmerican system.2 s7
B.

Submission of the Case to the Court When There Is No Friendly
Settlement

Although provisional measures are likely to be deemed binding on the
parties to the Inter-American Convention, these measures must be utilized in accordance with the Convention if the system is to function
properly. The Convention authorizes the Court to adopt provisional
measures in "matters it has under [its] consideration. 28 8 In these cases,
the provisional measures terminate, at the latest, upon final judgment.28 9
The Convention further authorizes the Court to adopt provisional mea-

285. Rules of Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights, supra note 89,
art. 36; Rules of Procedure of the European Commission on Human Rights, supra note
88, art. 36. The European Court commented in this regard, that even the wording of the
rule which states that the Commission "may indicate any interim measure the adoption
of which seems desirable" reflected the non-binding nature of the obligation. Cruz Varas
v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (1991).
286. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 63(2).
287. The legislative history of the Article on provisional measures does not provide
insight into the intent of the drafting body. Provisional measures were first raised by the
Costa Rican delegate who proposed that the Court be given the power, common to all
world tribunals, to act in serious and urgent situations. HUMAN RIGHTS, THE INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM, Vol. 2, Minutes of the Sixth Session of Committee II, Summary
Version, November 20, 1969, 214 (Buergenthal and Norris ed.). The text of the proposed Article read, "[tlhe Court shall be able to take provisional measures that it considers pertinent, in urgent situations and when there is sufficient cause to justify it, for the
protection of the right allegedly violated." The provision was defeated with one vote in
favor, none against, and sixteen abstentions. Id. at 215. At a subsequent meeting, the
Costa Rican representative introduced the provision in substantially its present form.
The provision passed, but the legislative history does not provide any discussion. Minutes
of the Third Plenary Session, Summary Version, November 21, 1969, in id. at 262.
288. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 63(2).
289. See SZTUCKI, supra note 42, at 198.
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sures at the request of the Commission "[w]ith respect to a case not yet
submitted to the Court,"29 0 a situation that applies while the Commission is undertaking the required procedures in a case.2 91 One goal of the
Commission in undertaking these procedures is to bring about a friendly
settlement between the parties.29 2 If the Commission is successful and
the parties reach a friendly settlement, provisional measures will no
longer be necessary. On the other hand, when a friendly settlement is not
reached, the reference in Article 63(2) to "a case not yet submitted to the
Court" implies that the Commission will refer the case to the Court. 293
Were the case to be submitted to the Court, the provisional measures
could be extended, if necessary, until final judgment.
The Commission does not currently comply with this provision of the
Convention, since it has not referred cases to the Court after requesting
that the Court adopt provisional measures. This malfunctioning of the
system results in conflict management problems and the prolongation of
provisional measures for the Court. In the Bustios-Rojas and Chunima
cases, the parties did not reach a friendly settlement, and the Commission failed to refer either case to the Court for final adjudication. The
Court cannot be expected to undertake long-term conflict management.
Provisional measures are by their very nature temporary and cannot be
prolonged indefinitely. 294 Moreover, these measures are to be ordered
provisionally only in cases of gravity and urgency. 29 5 The reality in
many parts of Latin America, however, is that an urgent situation may
continue, and a person may be in danger of irreparable injury for extended periods. It is untenable, however, for the Court to continue monitoring a state's compliance with provisional measures for an extended
period of time when the case is not on its docket.
Consequently, the Court has been forced to evolve a jurisprudential
approach to deal with this aberration. In the situation of a case not
before the Court, the Commission must show that the continuation of
provisional measures is necessary, or the Court will allow the measures
to lapse at the time stated in the initial court order.296 That was the

290. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 63(2) (emphasis added).
291. Articles 46-48 provide the procedures which the Commission must follow when
considering a case. American Convention, supra note 22, arts. 46-48. For a description
of the Commission's procedures, see supra note 156.
292. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 48(0.
293. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 63(2).
294. See DUMBAULD, supra note 43, at 4 (arguing that "protection thus afforded is
purely provisional").
295. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 63(2).
296. Letter from Hector Fix-Zamudio, President of the Inter-American Court of
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outcome in Chunima when the Commission failed to provide evidence to
refute Guatemala's claims that the situation had improved. Alternatively,
should the Commission show that the measures continue to be necessary
after a prolonged period, but fail to refer the case to the Court, the Court
may transfer the supervisory function to the Commission by returning
the proceedings to that body and entrusting it to verify the implementation of the measures, as it did in Bustios-Rojas.9 7 In Bustios-Rojas, the
Court returned the case to the Commission with the proviso that, should
the gravity and urgency of the situation warrant, the Commission could
again request that the Court adopt provisional measures. 9
The Court also sets time limits on provisional measures orders and
allows them to lapse at a set time if evidence is not produced of the
continued gravity and urgency of the situation. In Chunima, the Court
specified that the measures required would be in effect for a limited time
of approximately four months.2 99 The Court further ordered that the
government inform the Court what measures had been taken and that
the Inter-American Commission and the government duly inform the
30 0
President of the Court regarding the implementation of the measures.
When the government complied with its obligation and no contradictory
information was provided by the Commission, the Court, in accordance
with its order, allowed the provisional measures to lapse on the date
set.

30 1

Rather than requiring the Court to perform long-term management in
a case not before it, or requiring the Court to develop other, often less
than satisfactory alternatives, the Commission should utilize provisional
measures in accordance with the dictates of the Convention. Once the
Commission has requested provisional measures in a case not yet submitted to the Court, and the Court has adopted these measures, the Commission should refer the case to the Court in the absence of a friendly
settlement between the parties, and not stop short at the point of merely

Human Rights, to the Government of Guatemala (Dec. 3, 1991) (informing the government of the lapse in the required measures) (on file with the Court).

297. Second Order of the Court-Bustios-Rojas Case, Inter-Am. Court 15, 16,
OAS/ser.L/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991).
298. Id.
299. The Court's order was issued on August 1, 1991 and extended the Order of the
President of the Court until December 3, 1991. Order of the Court-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 52, 55, OAS/ser.L/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991).
300. Id.
301. Letter from Hector Fix-Zamudio, President of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, to the Government of Guatemala (Dec. 3, 1991), supra note 296 (on file
with the Court).
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requesting measures."' If the Commission were to refer the cases, the
Court could fully consider matters, arrive at a judgment, and provisional
measures could be terminated.
C. The Court's Imposition of Additional Requirements Beyond
Those Statutorily Requiredfor the Adoption of ProvisionalMeasures
In lieu of the proper functioning of the system, the Court appears to
be instituting additional requirements beyond those statutorily mandated
before adopting provisional measures. The Court, of course, enjoys discretionary power to order provisional measures. 30 3 This discretion, however, should be limited to determining the presence of the statutory requisites of extreme gravity and urgency, and the likelihood of irreparable
damage to persons.30 4
1. The Requirement That the Commission First Call Upon the Government to Take Precautionary Measures
The Court has stated repeatedly that the Commission must first request on its own authority that the state party take precautionary measures, and only when this avenue has not proved effective, may the Commission request that the Court adopt provisional measures. 5 The
Commission's adoption of precautionary measures is neither statutorily
required nor authorized. The American Convention, the Statute of the
Court, and the Statute of the Commission do not authorize the Commis302. See American Convention, supra note 22, art. 63(2).
303. European Court Rules, supra note 89, art. 24(1).
304. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 63(2).
305. In the Bustios-Rojas Case, the Commission simultaneously requested that the
Government take precautionary measures and that the Court adopt provisional measures.
Request for Provisional Measures-Bustios-Rojas Case, Inter-Am. Court 25, 28, OEA/
ser.G/CP, doc. 2146 (1991). In Chunima, the Commission did not request that the government take precautionary measures under Article 29. Although the Court ratified the
measures previously adopted by the President, it stated that the Commission had not
complied with Article 29. Order of the Court-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 52, 55,
OAS/ser.L/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991). In Chipoco, the Commission did not first request
precautionary measures. The President, in his resolution refusing to adopt provisional
measures, commented that the Commission "after adopting the measures established in
Article 29 of its Regulations" may then present the request to the Court. Order of the
President-Chipoco Case, Inter-Am. Court 97, 99, OAS/ser.L/V/III.27, doc. 10 (1992).
In the Peruvian Prisons Case, the Commission did first request precautionary measures,
which were ignored by the Government. The Court refused to adopt provisional measures on other grounds. Order of the President-Peruvian Prisons Case, Inter-Am. Court.
101, 104, OAS/ser.L/V/III.27, doc. 10 (1992).
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sion to take these measures. Article 29 of the Regulations of the Commission contains the only reference to provisional measures to be requested directly by the Commission and is essentially a power which the
Commission has granted to itself.30 6 Article 29 provides that, "[i]n urgent
cases, when it becomes necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons,
the Commission may request that provisional measures be taken to avoid
irreparable damage in cases where the denounced facts are true. "307
Governments are less likely to comply with measures requested by the
Commission. 0 Furthermore, those measures adopted by the Commission under the authority of Article 29 probably are not binding on the
state parties to the Convention.30 9 If a power is not authorized by an
instrument that has been ratified by the parties, the exercise of the power
usually is not binding on the parties. 1 ' Since Article 29 was never ratified by the state parties, but arose in the context of Commission selfregulation, the exercise of power by the Commission under the Article
does not bind the state parties. The requirement that the Commission
first adopt measures that may be ineffective undercuts the very purpose
of provisional measures; to act quickly and with authority in urgent
cases to avoid irreparable damage to persons.
Certainly, it would be more effective for the Inter-American system if
interim measures dictated by the Commission were binding on the parties. If that were the ease, there might be greater compliance with a
Commission request, which in turn would minimize the need to resort to
the Inter-American Court in every urgent situation. However, since the
states, in the exercise of their sovereignty, have not authorized the Commission to adopt provisional measures, and the European Court, in par-

306.
307.

Regulations of the Commission, supra note 141, art. 29(2).
Id.

308. See Order of the President-Peruvian Prisons Case, Inter-Am. Court 101, 104,
OAS/ser.L/V/III.27, doc. 10 (1992). See also Request for Provisional MeasuresBustios-Rojas Case, Inter-Am. Court 25, 28, OEA/ser.G/CP, doc. 2146 (1991) (the

Commission directly requested precautionary measures of the government and provisional measures from the Court simultaneously).
It could be said that the Government of Guatemala complied with a specific request
for precautionary measures in the Chunima Case. Guatemala announced at the public
hearing before the Court that it had arrested the two civil patrol leaders charged with the
murders of the human rights activists. The arrests had been requested earlier by the
Commission with no immediate results. The President of the Court had not made that
request of the government. It is questionable, however, whether Guatemala would have
made the arrests without the pressure of the public hearing. See Order of the CourtChunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 52, OAS/ser.L/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991).
309. Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (1991).
310. Id.; see SZTUCKI, supra note 42, at 64-65.
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allel circumstances has held that provisional measures are not binding on
the state party,3 11 it is unlikely that the Inter-American Court could justify an opposite holding were the issue before it. As stated in reference to
the ICJ, "the Court cannot afford to reach decisions, even on applications for interim measures of protection, which suggest support for rules
3 12
which are too far advanced for community acceptance.
Although the Commission should be encouraged to request directly
that the state adopt interim measures, and the state should be encouraged to comply with the Commission's request, in circumstances in
which the situation is grave and urgent and the lives and safety of persons are imminently at risk, the Court should not insist upon a potentially ineffective Commission request before adopting provisional
measures.
2.

Regulations of the Commission and the Standard of Proof

In addition to the requirement that the Commission first request that
a government take precautionary measures before the Commission turns
to the Court, 313 the Court further requir6s that the standard of proof
enunciated in Article 29(2) must be met before the Commission may
request that the Court impose provisional measures.3 14 Article 29(2) of
the Commission's Regulations allows the Commission to request interim
measures "incases where the denounced facts are true." 1 ' This reference to Article 29 as a prerequisite to a request of the Court appears to
be technically inappropriate, for as previously noted this Article is applicable only when the Commission itself, and not the Court, adopts interim measures.

A separate provision, Article 76 of the Regulations of the Commission, 16 governs those instances when the Commission requests that the
Court take provisional measures. Article 76 clarifies the conventional
power granted to the Commission to request that the Court adopt provisional measures in grave and urgent situations "ina matter that has not
yet been submitted to the Court. ' 317 Located in the chapter addressed to

311. Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (1991).
312. Peter J. Goldsworthy, Interim Measures of Protection in the International
Court of Justice, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 258, 263 (1974).
313. Regulations of the Commission, supra note 141, art. 29.
314. Order of the Court-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 52, 55, OAS/ser.L/V/
111.25, doc. 7 (1991).
315. Regulations of the Commission, supra note 141, art. 29(2).
316. Id. art. 76.
317. Id.
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procedures before the Court, this provision is similar to and includes
little more than is included in Article 63(2) of the Convention, which
governs provisional measures. 8 ' Primarily, Article 76 expedites the judicial process by allowing the request to the Court to be made by the
Chairman or Vice-Chairman when the Commission is not in session. M
The Article does not include a standard for its application such as the
"in cases where the denounced facts are true" standard of Article 29.

The Court's reference to Article 29 -of the Commission's Regulations
may be interpreted to mean that the Court has chosen to graft the standard of Article 29 onto Article 76.320 The Court may reason that if the
Commission will not adopt precautionary measures unless "the denounced facts are true," then it likewise should not request that the
Court order provisional measures unless this standard is met. If this is
the case, however, the Court should clarify its position. The Court has
determined that under this standard, in both the Article 29 and Article
76 contexts, it is "not a question of fully determining the truth of the
facts; rather, the Commission must have a reasonable basis for assuming
them to be true."3 2' The Commission must ascertain "the truth of the
allegations, though in preliminary fashion," 322 and transmit the corresponding evidence to the Court with the request for provisional
measures.

323

3. The Requirement that the Commission Have Evidence in Addition
to the Petition
It is necessary for the Commission to transmit the evidence of the allegations of urgency and danger to the Court so that the Court may make
an independent evaluation of the facts. The Court is at a disadvantage

318. Article 76 provides that "[i]n cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when it
becomes necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons in a matter that has not yet
been submitted to the Court for consideration, the Commission may request it to adopt
any provisional measures it deems pertinent." Id.
319. Id. art. 76(2).
320.

The Court seems to have rejected the prima facie standard, which the Commis-

applied in its request for provisional measures in the Chunima case. Request for
Provisional Measures-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court. 41, 44, OAS/ser.L/V/III.25,
doc. 7 (1991).
321. Order of the Court-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 52, 55, OAS/ser.L/V/
111.25, doc. 7 (1991).
322. Order of the President-Chipoco Case, Inter-Am. Court 97, 99, OAS/ser.L/V/
111.27, doc. 10 (1992).
323. Order of the Court-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 52, 55, OAS/ser.L/V/
111.25, doc. 7 (1991).
sion
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when provisional measures are requested in cases not before it, as the
Court "lacks information regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. '"324 The underlying information is essential to the
Court's consideration of a request because the Court does not rely on the
Commission's statement of the underlying facts, but rather re-evaluates
the situation for itself.325 The Court, therefore, requires the Commission
to gather "preliminary evidence to support a presumption of the truth of
the allegations,"326 and provide this evidence to enable the Court to arrive at a decision. 2' The transmittal of sufficient information has been a
problem for the Court. The Court has not always been satisfied with the

information supplied and has stated repeatedly that the information supplied was insufficient to support the adoption of provisional measures.3 2 8
Unfortunately, the Court has not specified the sources of evidence that
would serve to establish a "reasonable basis" for assuming the truth of
the facts.1 2' The Court has stated that the petitioner's unsubstantiated
allegations of the facts are not adequate to meet the burden imposed by
this standard. 330
324. Id.
325. See, for example, the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, where the Court requested
additional information. Judgment of the Court-Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am.
Court 35, 42, OAS/ser.L/V/III.19, doc. 13 (1988).
326. See Order of the President-Peruvian Prisons Case, Inter-Am. Court 101, 103,
OAS/ser.L/V/III.27, doc. 10 (1992); Order of the President-Chipoco Case, Inter-Am.
Court 97, 99, OAS/ser.L/V/III.27, doc. 10 (1992).
327. Id.
328. See Order of the President-Peruvian Prisons Case, Inter-Am. Court 101, 103,
OAS/ser.L/V/III.27, doc. 10 (1992); Order of the President-Chipoco Case, Inter-Am.
Court 97, 99, OAS/ser.L/V/III.27, doc. 10 (1992).
329. Order of the Court-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 52, 55, OAS/ser.L/V/
111.25, doc. 7 (1991).
330. Id. Conversely, it appears that any admission of the government, no matter how
general, may serve as adequate evidence of the truth of the allegations. In Chunima, the
Court found that the Commission did not have a reasonable basis for assuming the facts
of the petition to be true, as the Commission's request "merely transcribe[d] the facts
reported by the petitioner." Id. at 55. Despite the lack of basis, the Court also found that
the President's order of provisional measures was properly adopted. Id. The Court based
this determination on the "blanket acknowledgment" by the government that for the last
thirty years there had been an "internal armed conflict" that resulted in the occurrence
of violent acts in the Chunima area. Id. The Court found that this statement lead to the
"presumption that a situation exists which could bring about irreparable damage to persons." Id. If this general acknowledgment is truly sufficient evidence to give rise to an
order for provisional measures, then in the future any requests for provisional measures
arising in the highlands of Guatemala or in many other conflicted areas in Latin
America, should result in a presumption that the situation could bring about irreparable
damage to persons. This would weaken the standard rather than strengthening it. Even
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The requirement that the Commission not rely solely on the petition
to provide a reasonable basis for assuming the truth of the allegations, if
not reconsidered, may prove to be unduly limiting. It is true that, in
many cases, relying on the unsupported facts provided by the petitioner,
who is the injured party or a relation, and thus emotionally involved in
the case, might not provide a reasonable basis for assuming the truth of
the facts. Should the petitioner be a disinterested third party who has
studied the situation, however, the evidence should be considered more
reliable.
In the Inter-American system, the petitioner may be someone other
than the victim of the abuses. For instance, the petitioner may be an
international nongovernmental organization that has studied the situation and interviewed the participants. 33 ' Any state party to the American
Convention automatically agrees to the right of individual petition, not
only by the victim or relative of the victim, but also by "any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more member states" of the
OAS. 32 This expanded opportunity under the American Convention allows nongovernmental organizations, which have more extensive resources than individuals and suffer fewer security problems, to investigate and file complaints. 3
Two nongovernmental organizations, America's Watch and Center for
Justice & International Law (CEJIL),3 34 that had investigated and verified the abuses, were the joint petitioners in Chunima. These organizations filed a detailed petition furnishing the dates, places, and facts for
all those who had been threatened and killed. No other supporting documentation was supplied to the Court. The Court found that the petition

more damaging, this policy of accepting government allegations as true, without more,
encourages governments to refrain from submitting any information to the Court, for fear
that this information will be used against it. Guatemala had not only commented on its

internal situation but had expressed a willingness to comply with the order of provisions
by the President. and had taken effective steps to put the order into effect. Id. at 53-54.
Compliance by the State Parties should be encouraged.
331. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 44.

332. Id. In the European System, a State Party may make an express declaration
recognizing the competence of the Commission to receive petitions from individuals. Such
a declaration allows a petition to be made by any person, nongovernmental organization
(NGO), or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation. European Convention, supra note 72, art. 25. In the Inter-American system, the NGO need not be the
victim, but can file on behalf of the victim. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 44.
333. Id.
334. Request for Provisional Measures-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 42, 42,

OAS/ser.L/V/III.25, doc. 7 (1991).

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Volt. 26.803

was not sufficient to prove the truth of the allegations.33 Conversely, the
Court did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in the BustiosRojas Case, in which the petitioner was the Committee to Protect Journalists, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization based in New York, that
documents and publicizes worldwide abuse against journalists. 3 6 In Bustios-Rojas, the only case in which the Court deemed that the information
submitted was sufficient, the petitioner submitted newspaper articles documenting the abuses, which the Commission transmitted to the Court
along with its request for provisional measures. 337 Newspaper articles
documenting threats and abuses, when available, are undoubtedly an excellent source of evidence. It is unlikely, however, that newspaper accounts consistently will be available given the limitations on freedom of
the press and the self-censorship found in many states. Even in the Bustios-Rojas Case the articles did not come from Peru's major newspapers,
but only from the newspaper that had employed Bustios as a journalist.
Had the petitioner been a victim or a relative of a victim and also
attached a relevant report by America's Watch or other well respected
NGO, one would suppose that the Commission then would have a reasonable basis for assuming the facts to be true. When the petitioner is
the same party who has investigated the facts, it is difficult to determine
what type of evidence would be acceptable to meet the standard of proof.
The victims or family members of the victims could sign affidavits, but
this merely would be equivalent to the unverified word of the party represented by the petitioner. Perhaps affidavits of witnesses would be sufficient, but this approach, as was alleged in the Bustios-Rojas Case, would
likely put those witnesses in greater danger. It would seem that when the
petitioner is a respected human rights organization whose work is known
to the Commission, and when that NGO has undertaken a study of the
facts before presenting them to the Commission, the Commission should
be deemed to have a reasonable basis for assuming the veracity of the
facts reported. The Government will subsequently have the opportunity
to refute the allegations at a public hearing.3 3
If NGO reports are not adequate to provide a reasonable basis for
335. Order of the Court-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 52, 55, OAS/ser.L/V/
111.25, doc. 7 (1991).
336. Request for Provisional Measures--Bustios-Rojas Case, Inter-Am. Court 25,
OEA/ser.G/CP, doc. 2146 (1991).
337. See Bustios-Rojas file at the Inter-American Court.
338. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 24(4). This guarantee is not as effective under the new modified version of Rule 24(4). Under the modified rule, the plenary
Court will not reconsider any measures adopted by the President until its next regular
session, which could be six months in the future. Supra note 161.
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assuming the truth of the facts, it appears that the only remaining avenue is for the Commission to independently verify the facts. Independent
verification could be undertaken through on-site visits in the state where
the provisional measures are requested, or by conducting witness interviews and studying written accounts outside the state. Both types of studies are time-consuming and thus are not ideal in urgent situations when
a person's life or safety is endangered. An on-site study is, of course,
preferable because it accords access to the alleged potential victims.
These visits, however, must be approved by the state party to be visited."3 9 As the Court has stated: "The State controls the means to verify
acts occurring within its territory. Although the Commission has investigatory powers, it cannot exercise them within a State's jurisdiction unless
it has the cooperation of that State."3 4 ' The difficulty of obtaining such
permission was evident in Peruvian Prisons, in which the Commission
formally requested, and was denied, permission to visit the prisons. 1
Even if permission is granted, on-site visits are time-consuming and
expensive. The Commission does not possess the resources to independently investigate every complaint and every request for provisional mea-

sures. 42 Furthermore, the need for immediate action could not be satisfied when this time-consuming approach was employed. Given the lack
of realistic alternatives, the Court should specify at least some basic
forms of evidence, in addition to the Commission studies, that it would
regard as adequate. NGO investigative reports should be included in the
types of evidence which would at least provide a "reasonable basis" for
assuming the truth of the facts.
D.

OAS Increase in Court Sessions and Fundingfor Human
Rights

The Court is justifiably reluctant to adopt provisional measures in instances when a case is not before the Court. Should the Court open itself
up to greater consideration of these cases, the number and type of human
rights abuses in the Americas could conceivably result in an avalanche of
requests. The urgency of many of these situations, however, should over-

339. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 48(2).
340. Judgment of the Court-Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Court 35, 61,
OAS/ser.L/V/III.19, doc. 13 (1988).
341. Order of the President-Peruvian Prisons Case, Inter-Am. Court 101, 102-03,
OAS/ser.L/V/III.27, doc. 10 (1992); cf. T.O. ELIAS, NEW HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

95 (2d. rev. ed., 1992).

342. See Volio, supra note 37, at 71 (for the proposition that the volume and seriousness of human rights denunciations has no parallel in history).
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shadow any hesitancy on the part of the Court to limit its caseload or to
avoid the potential conflict-management role involved in overseeing the
implementation of the measures ordered. 4
The adoption of provisional measures must be limited to cases of extreme gravity and urgency when the Court has sufficient evidence that a
person is in danger of being tortured or killed. The Court has emphasized that the adoption of provisional measures should not be a normal
exercise of the Court's jurisdiction. 44 The Court's position is in keeping
with international law, which deems provisional measures to be an exceptional remedy. The ICJ has held that the power to adopt interim
measures is exceptional and is only conferred on the judiciary under the
express terms of the statute if the court considers that the circumstances
so require.34 5
Unfortunately, in the Inter-American system, grave and urgent human
rights violations that call for the implementation of provisional measures
occur on a regular basis. If the Court has compelling evidence that the
requisites for this relief are present, the Court should adopt provisional
measures. If the Court is to exercise its mandate to enforce human rights
in the Americas, it may be necessary for the Court to adopt provisional
measures whenever the circumstances show a grave and urgent possibility of irreparable harm to persons. The difficulty with this approach is
that the Court, which meets only infrequently, could not process a significant increase in its caseload.
A developing problem in the Inter-American human rights system is
the infrequency of the Court's sessions. The Court, since its inception,
has functioned on a part-time basis, holding two, and sometimes three,
regular two week sessions per year.34 6 The seven judges, 4 ' who must be
nationals of different states, 348 are at the disposal of the Court and travel

343. Cf. Goldsworthy, supra note 312, at 258 (for similar argument regarding the
adoption of interim measures in environmental cases).
344. Order of the Court-Chunima Case, Inter-Am. Court 52, 55, OAS/ser.L/V/
111.25, doc. 7 (1991). See Order of the President-Chipoco Case, Inter-Am. Court 97, 99,
OAS/ser.L/V/III.27, doc. 10 (1992); Order of the President-Peruvian Prisons Case, Inter-Am. Court 101, 104, OAS/ser.L/V/III.27, doc. 10 (1992).
345. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turk.), 1076 I.C.J. 3, 11.
346. Court Rules of Procedure, Inter-Am. Court 18, 21, art. 11, OAS/ser.L/V/
111.25, doc. 7 (1991). In addition the Court may meet for special sessions. Id. art. 12.
347. The judges must be jurists of the "highest moral authority" and be "recognized
for their competence in the field of human rights." American Convention, supra note 22,
art. 4.

348.

American Convention, supra note 22, art. 52(1).
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to the seat of the Court when necessary.349 The requirement that the

judges readily be available is partially a recognition of the urgent nature
of many of the cases within the Court's competency.35 0
The infrequent meetings of the Court were adequate in the years immediately following its inception, but rapidly are becoming inadequate to
process the ever increasing caseload of the Court.3 5 1 Initially, the Court's
caseload was light. The Court, which has jurisdiction to hear contentious
cases,3 52 issue advisory opinions, 35 3 and adopt provisional measures at
the request of the Commission, "" issued only twelve advisory opinions
and decided one joined contentious case in the first ten years of its existence.3 55 By contrast, in the first six months of 1993, the Court has considered or is considering five contentious cases, two requests for provisional measures, and one request for an advisory opinion.3 5 1 If the
Court's caseload continues to increase, it will be necessary for the Court
35 7
to meet more regularly or perhaps become a permanently sitting court.

349. Statute of the Court, supra note 161, art. 16. Most of the judges, who are paid
emoluments, per diem, and travel allowances when the Court is in session, have full time
positions in their countries of residence. Id. art. 17. The Statute of the Court also lists
positions and activities which are incompatible with a judgeship on the Inter-American
Court. Id. art. 18.
350. As explained by Dunshee de Abranches, a renowned legal scholar of international law and the Inter-American system:
Even though they are not required to live in the place where the Court has its
permanent seat, the judges must be at the disposal of the only jurisdictional organ
of the OAS, particularly for the urgent and serious cases requiring provisional
measures that the Commission can request from the Court in crisis situations,
which arise so frequently in the lives of the American peoples.
Abranches, supra note 30, at 79, 96.
351. See id. (arguing that the judges should sit full-time).
352. American Convention, supra note 22, art. 63.
353. Id. art. 64.
354. Id. art. 63(2).
355. See General information of the Court, issued by the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (on file with the author). Note that the Court did not accept the contentious case of the government of Costa Rica (In the Matter of Viviana Gallardo et al.), 20
I.L.M. 1424 (1981).
356. Id.
357. The Court's draft Statute originally envisioned a permanent court with fulltime judges. The General Assembly of the OAS found this proposal unjustified until such
time as the Court would have a substantial caseload. Thomas Buergenthal, The InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 231, 232-33, nn. 11, 17 (1982)
(citing draft Statute OEA/ser.P/AG/doc.1 112/79 (Oct. 10, 1979), arts. 20 and 22); see
Drucker, supra note 183, at 321 (stating that there is a need for a permanent or semipermanent Court); see Ryssdal, supra note 77, at 11 (arguing that a full time European
Court of Human Rights will be necessary in the foreseeable future due to the increasing
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An increase in the sessions of the Court will require a corresponding
increase in financing. Unfortunately, the OAS, which funds the Court, is
experiencing an almost continual fiscal crisis that shows no signs of abating."' 8 If the OAS cannot obtain greater funding, which appears likely in
the current economic crisis, then the time has come for the OAS to reevaluate its priorities and eliminate all but the most essential avenues of
spending. A top priority in the Inter-American system must be the promotion and protection human rights, 59 for the gross and systematic violation of human rights is one of the gravest problems facing the Americas. This priority is not reflected in the budget of the OAS. Currently,
the OAS allocates funding to various social and cultural programs and
studies, 60 and while these programs are no doubt valuable, their impact
pales compared to that of monitoring and enforcing of human rights in
the Americas. 6' Many social and cultural activities of the OAS should
be dropped or should depend on voluntary contributions. The OAS
should instead focus additional attention and financing on the InterAmerican Court and Commission if it hopes to enforce human rights in
the Americas.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Most states, even those that commit gross and systematic human rights
violations, do not wish to be identified as violators of human rights. The
rapid focus of international publicity, therefore, has to date proved to be
an effective means of preventing and curtailing human rights abuses.
The referral of a case to an international human rights court can focus
this international attention, but the delay for a case to reach the Court is

workload.)
358. See Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American Court and the OAS, 7 HuM.
RTs. L. J. 157-63 (1986).
359. See Farer, supra note 13, at 401 (commenting that critics have cited the InterAmerican Commission as the main justification for the existence of the OAS.)
360. Organization of American States, Proceeding, Volume I, Twenty-Second Regular Session, Nassau, The Bahamas, May 18-23, 1992, OEA/Ser.P/XXII.O.2, June 21,
1992, Court Budget, 77-88.
361. Canada, which joined the OAS on January 8, 1990, has urged that the OAS
increase financial support for the Inter-American human rights system. See L.A. Address by the Honorable Barbara McDougall, Canadian Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs to the XXIII OAS General Assembly (June 7, 1993) (on file with the author).
Furthermore, Canada has advocated that funding be curtailed to certain OAS committees
including the Inter-American Defense Board. Conversation with Harold Hickman,
Counsellor and Alternative Representative of the Canadian Mission to the OAS (Oct.
1993).
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normally a matter of years. A unique power of the Inter-American system that allows the Inter-American Commission to request the InterAmerican Court to adopt provisional measures minimizes delay and allows the formalized human rights system to act quickly. The most important advantage of this use of provisional measures in the Inter-American system is that these measures immediately provide protection for
potential victims.
Provisional measures must be binding on the parties if they are to be
maximally effective in the Inter-American system. The Commission
must utilize requests for measures in accordance with the directives of
the American Convention. After requesting provisional measures in a
case not yet submitted to the Court, the Commission subsequently should
submit the case to the Court if the parties do not reach a friendly settlement. Should provisional measures be employed as was foreseen by the
Convention, the Court will have less need to limit the consideration of
requests for provisional measures by demanding additional requirements
beyond those statutorily mandated.
Even with the above procedural changes, a continuing barrier to the
effective use of provisional measures, as well as to the overall functioning
of the human rights system in the Americas, is the limited funding and
the resulting infrequent sessions of the Inter-American Court. The flagrant human rights abuses in the Americas and the resultant increase in
the caseload of the Court mandate that funding for the Court now be
increased to allow for more frequent meetings. The OAS is experiencing
a long-standing financial crisis, the proper solution to which is to limit
the number of roles that the OAS attempts to play. Many social and
cultural activities of the OAS should be dropped or should be dependent
on voluntary contributions. This will permit the OAS to focus on its
most important mandate, to enforce human rights in the Americas.
Provisional measures will never be a panacea to all human rights
problems in this hemisphere. These measures realistically can protect
only a few people in limited situations. The threat of their adoption by
the Court, however, and the attention drawn to a situation when such
measures are adopted, can have a chilling effect on human rights abuses
in the area and would be another step toward ending these abuses
worldwide.

